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ABSTRACT 
THE 1868 ST. LANDRY MASSACRE: RECONSTRUCTION'S DEADLIEST 
EPISODE OF VIOLENCE 
 
by 
Matthew Christensen 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2012 
Under the Supervision of Professor Robert S. Smith 
 
 The St. Landry Massacre is representative of the pervasive violence and 
intimidation in the South during the 1868 presidential canvass and represented the 
deadliest incident of racial violence during the Reconstruction Era.  Southern 
conservatives used large scale collective violence in 1868 as a method to gain political 
control and restore the antebellum racial hierarchy.  From 1865-1868, these Southerners 
struggled against the federal government, carpetbaggers, and Southern black populations 
to gain this control, but had largely failed in their attempts.  After the First 
Reconstruction Act of March, 1867 forced Southern governments to accept universal 
male suffrage, Southern conservatives utilized violence and intimidation to achieve their 
goals, which escalated as the 1868 presidential election neared.  Violence was nearly 
omnipresent in Louisiana during the presidential canvass and was the primary reason 
behind the Democratic victory in the state. 
 This violence not only succeeded in its initial goal of securing a victory for the 
Democratic Party during the 1868 presidential election, but long term consequences also 
arose.  Louisiana responded to the violence with a series of election laws, one creating 
  iv 
the Returning Board on Elections, a potentially corrupt committee that could decide 
elections in the state by invalidating votes it deemed to be obtained by fraud.  Nationally, 
the First Enforcement Act protected black voters and rights granted by previous 
reconstruction legislation.  St. Landry Parish illustrates the local shift of power after 
1868, where an instance of conservative boss rule occurred and the parish Republican 
Party was unable to fully recover for the remainder of Reconstruction.  By 1874, 
conservative Democratic control was so complete in St. Landry that it became home to 
Louisiana's first White League.  Although 1868 was the peak of Reconstruction Era 
violence, conservative Democrats resorted to force when other attempts at regional 
control failed for the remainder of the period. 
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Chapter I 
Early Power Struggles in the South During Reconstruction 
 
 The St. Landry Massacre of 1868 was not an isolated incident.  Instead, the events 
in St. Landry serve as both a case study in and a precursor for the violence that would 
come to earmark the Reconstruction Era.  This violence emerged out of the struggle 
between former Southern confederate loyalists, Southern black populations, Republican 
politicians in the South,  pejoratively known in the region as carpetbaggers, and the 
federal government in deciding the scope and scale of freedmen's rights after 
emancipation.  White Southerners, who were overwhelmingly Democrats, generally 
preferred a return to the antebellum racial hierarchy while Republicans promoted steps 
towards equality for the freedmen.  Southern attempts to control the freedmen labor 
force, including labor fraud, economic sanctions, and legislation, largely failed by 1868 
and forced changes in Democratic strategies.  These failures, when combined with poor 
economic conditions, legislative setbacks, and an upcoming presidential election in 1868, 
led Democrats to champion violence and intimidation as means to acquire political 
victories.   
 While these tactics did not lead Democrats to a national victory in the 1868 
presidential election, they did win Louisiana and were able to secure a long-term power 
base in localities that could not effectively curtail large scale collective violence directed 
at Republicans, white and black alike.  St. Landry Parish, being the center of the largest 
racial massacre during Reconstruction, was one of these locales, where no Republican 
organization was present that could threaten local Democratic superiority for the 
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remainder of the period.  Democratic control was so secure that Thomas C. Anderson, a 
state Senator, was able to consolidate power in the parish after the massacre.  By 1874, 
St. Landry became the home of the first Louisiana White League, a Democratic 
paramilitary organization designed to remove Republican officeholders from their 
positions.  To understand why the massacre occurred, economic, social, and political 
realities of St. Landry Parish and Louisiana as a whole must be examined first.  
 After the Civil War, the Southern economy was in shambles.  In Louisiana, 
capital and credit starved planters often struggled to make ends meet and natural disasters 
in both 1866 and 1867 crippled production levels on farms.  To complicate the situation, 
many Southerners lost significant portions of their wealth due to the emancipation of 
their slaves, who now required pay.  The ensuing struggle to determine the system of 
labor and rights granted to the freedmen existed on the national, state, and local levels.  
The Freedmen's Bureau and Union Leagues attempted to aid the freedmen in their 
transition from slavery to freedom while Southern conservatives, led by multiple failed 
presidential vetoes, attempted to prevent any measures of reconstruction.  These federal 
organizations also attempted to prevent methods of freedmen labor control by Southern 
conservatives, including labor fraud and economic sanctions.  Southern states passed 
repressive Black Codes in 1865 and 1866, measures that were mostly counteracted by the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866.  By March, 1867, universal male suffrage became inevitable 
with the First Reconstruction Act and violence became a strategy for controlling the 
South's black population.  This violence escalated as the 1868 presidential election grew 
near and resulted in the utilization of large scale massacres to control the black vote.  The 
1868 massacres occurred as part of a progression of the sectional conflict over what 
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reconstruction should entail and only occurred after previous Southern attempts failed to 
wrest control from "Congressional usurp(ers)."1 
Reconstruction began early in Louisiana.  In April 1862, General Benjamin F. 
Butler captured New Orleans, leaving Vicksburg as the last Southern stronghold on the 
Mississippi at this point of the Civil War.  Given on January 1, 1863, the Emancipation 
Proclamation freed all slaves in areas that were still in rebellion.  Because Louisiana 
produced the vast majority of the nation's sugar and its production could not be replaced 
without importation, the federal army took control of sugar parishes within the state, 
which excluded slaves in this area from the Emancipation Proclamation.  However, 
federal control did not reach throughout Louisiana, leaving many parishes in the northern 
and western areas of the state disputed.  St. Landry Parish fell in the area outside of 
federal reach and was not fully secured until the war's end.  In the federally controlled 
region, blacks were forced to remain at work on plantations under contract with army 
supervision, although corporal punishment was outlawed as a means to control labor.  
Planters conflicted often with both regional blacks and the Union army.  By this point, 
the slaves, realizing they were on the precipice of freedom, began to assert rights such as 
a Saturday holiday.  The Union army confiscated crops, property, and was often blamed 
for poor crop yields after occupation; the common Southern belief being that if slaves 
were not induced to work, productivity would fall drastically.  Louisiana's constitutional 
convention of 1864 was able to abolish slavery in the state after Confederate General 
                                                 
1
 Opelousas Courier, 5/16/1868. 
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Nathaniel P. Banks suffered multiple defeats in the Louisiana Red River campaign, but 
sufficient support for universal suffrage was still absent at this time.2 
 Louisiana contained a distinct black Creole demographic labeled as les gens de 
couleur libre, or “the free people of color,” a group mostly contained within New 
Orleans.  These free people of color were of African and European (mainly French or 
Spanish) origin, and enjoyed many rights not accorded to other black individuals in the 
state during antebellum years, including property rights.  Property rights, education, and a 
desire to be considered distinct from the other black populations in the United States 
allowed for this free population to hold slaves and become prosperous.  After the Civil 
War, however, many members of this group did not fare well, as they “had not only lost 
their slaves, farm machinery, livestock, buildings, and personal possessions, but their 
land as well.”  While a large amount of the free people of color lost much of their 
antebellum status and wealth during the Reconstruction period, some maintained 
influence.  One of these influential free people of color was Louis Roudanez, the founder 
of the New Orleans Tribune, a Radical paper that occasionally came into conflict with 
moderate Republican leadership.3 
 Prior to the Civil War, St. Landry Parish contained much of southwestern 
Louisiana, ranging from the current Texas-Louisiana border with the Sabine River in the 
west, the Gulf of Mexico to the south, bordered by Point Coupe and St. Martin parishes 
to the east, and Rapides and Avoyelles parishes to the north.  In 1840, Calcasieu Parish 
                                                 
2
 John C. Rodrigue, Reconstruction in the Cane Fields: From Slavery to Free Labor in Louisiana's Sugar 
Parishes, 1862-1880 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2001), 33-51; Carolyn E. DeLatte, 
"Reconstruction in St. Landry Through 1868" (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, McNeese State University, 
1972), 8-21, hereafter cited as DeLatte, "Reconstruction."; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural 
Yearbook, 1923 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924), 220. 
3
 Loren Schweninger, “Antebellum Free Persons of Color in Postbellum Louisiana,” Louisiana History 30, 
no. 4 (Autumn 1989), 345-364. 
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formed out of western St. Landry Parish.  By 1860, St. Landry's northern border 
experienced minor changes and on the southern border Vermillion and Lafayette parishes 
were created.  By the start of the Civil War, St. Landry Parish contained 1,405,000 acres 
of land and multiple bayous, the most important two being Bayou Courtableau and Bayou 
Teche.   St. Landry contained multiple types of soil and land, allowing for a diversity of 
agricultural ventures.  Alluvial soil was found near parish waterways and was suitable for 
both cotton and sugar production.  The parish also contained prairie land that was 
confined to its western reaches, where livestock became the primary commodity.  In the 
central and northern areas of the parish, away from the hilly region near Opelousas, black 
prairie soil was found and used for cultivation of corn and cotton.4 
 In the early 1740's the first French traders appeared in Opelousas, the eventual 
parish seat of St. Landry Parish, during a time where western Louisiana was considered 
to be a frontier and later a gateway to Mexico for the Spanish.  The land traded hands 
between the French and Spanish several times during the remainder of the century, until 
the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 transferred control to the United States.  During its early 
years under European control, St. Landry's economic staples consisted of cattle and fur.  
The population of the parish remained small until American control, numbering only 
2,453 in 1803.  By 1820, cotton had received extended attention, contributing to a sharp 
population increase to 10,085, numbering 5,368 free whites, 3,951 slaves, and 756 free 
persons of color.  With increasing cotton production and further settlement west, 
                                                 
4
 E.W. Hilgard, "Report on the Cotton Production of the State of Louisiana, With a Discussion of the 
General Agricultural Features of the State," U.S. Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census, Report on Cotton 
Production (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1883), 22-24; Keith Sheldon Hambrick, "The 
Social History of St. Landry Parish, 1850-1860" (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, McNeese State University, 
1971), 1-4. 
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Opelousas and St. Landry Parish increased in population throughout the antebellum 
years.5  
 By 1860, at 23,104 inhabitants, St. Landry was the third most populated parish in 
the state, behind only Orleans and Rapides.  Of these, 11,436 were slaves, 10,703 were 
white, 965 were free people of color, and one person was unlabeled.  As sugar and cotton 
were the most profitable goods produced in the parish at the time and each required 
distinct systems of labor, the evolution of labor in the parish was correlated to their 
presence.  In 1860, cotton (2.7% of the statewide yield) was produced on a larger scale in 
the parish than sugar (1.6%) and cane molasses (2.5%).  These goods, along with corn, 
were produced along St. Landry's waterways and in most of the parish outside of its 
western reaches.  Other goods produced include cheese (19%), tobacco (12.8%), wool 
(9.6%), Indian corn (4.8%), and insignificant quantities of beans, beeswax, butter, hay, 
honey, peas, Irish potatoes, sweet potatoes, rice, and varied manufactured goods.  Prairie 
land in western St. Landry was far from its population centers of Opelousas and 
Washington, but provided significant portions of Louisiana's cheese and wool 
production.6 
 Louisiana in the nineteenth century contained two important economic staples, 
sugar and cotton.  Sugar was mostly confined to southeastern Louisiana while cotton 
dominated the northern reaches of the state.  St. Landry Parish was located on the 
outskirts of the sugar region, so while cotton remained the predominant crop sugar still 
                                                 
5
 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Fourth Census, 1820 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1821); 
Winston DeVille, Opelousas: The History of a French and Spanish Military Post in America, 1716-1803 
(Cottonport, Louisiana: Polyanthos, Inc., 1973), 14-34.; Hambrick, 1-19.; Francois Xavier Martin, The 
History of Louisiana From the Earliest Period (New Orleans: A.T. Penniman & Co., 1829), 205. 
6
 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Eighth Census of Agriculture, 1860 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1864); U.S. Bureau of the Census, Ninth Census of Population, 1870 (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1872). 
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held influence.  However, the importance of sugar dwindled in the parish prior to the 
Civil War.  St. Landry produced 5,950 hogsheads7 of sugar cane (2.6% of total statewide 
production) and 317,970 gallons of cane molasses (2.9%) in 1850, but 1860 saw a 
decrease to only 3,437 hogsheads of sugar cane (1.55%) and an increase to 339,610 
gallons of cane molasses (2.5%).  St. Landry's sugar production recovered when 
comparing parish output to the statewide yield in 1870, with 1,988 hogsheads of sugar 
cane (2.5%), and 118,110 gallons of molasses cane (2.6%), but natural disasters, 
deterioration of capital, and labor issues all stunted total production after the Civil War.  
Sugar did not experience recovery approaching prewar numbers until the 1880's, aided by 
improved technology and more reliable labor.  This reliable labor force was gradually 
obtained through concessions made by planters as Reconstruction progressed, as federal 
agencies and legislation forced planters to realize that a full return to the antebellum 
racial hierarchy was impossible.  In the 1880 census returns, St. Landry Parish produced 
2,877 hogsheads of sugar (1.7%) and 190,937 gallons of cane molasses (1.6%).  The shift 
from sugar to cotton in the parish was drastic, as Louisiana produced 21,128 (2.7%) bales 
of cotton during the 1860 census year while the 1870 returns show a yield of 14,305 
(4.1%) bales.  By 1880, St. Landry Parish produced 23,148 bales of cotton (4.6%).8   
 In St. Landry Parish during Reconstruction, sugar was unable to overtake cotton 
as the predominant crop and held limited significance in regard to statewide production.  
By the 1870 census, 78% of total farms in the parish were under fifty acres, suggesting 
dominance of small land holdings that correspond with sharecropping, as opposed to the 
                                                 
7
 One hogshead usually equaled 1,000 pounds when dealing with sugar. 
8
 Eighth Census of Agriculture, 1860; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Ninth Census of Agriculture, 1870 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1872); U.S. Bureau of the Census, Compendium of the 
Tenth Census, 1880 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1885); H. Niles, ed., "Culture of the 
Sugar Cane," Niles' Weekly Register 49 (September, 1835 – March, 1836), 10/24/1835, 129. 
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large, centralized plantations usually used for successful sugar planting.  But, sugar's 
presence in the parish cannot be ignored, as unique labor formations intrinsic to sugar 
planting impacted the regional effectiveness of violence and intimidation, where sugar 
laborers were often more protected against attacks due to their proximity to one another 
compared to the isolated nature of tenant farmers in the countryside.9  
 After the Civil War, "King Cotton" had not lost its importance in the South and 
northern Louisiana parishes were no different.  Cotton was generally planted annually 
around March.  During the summer months, the process of thinning took place, removing 
inferior plants until the remaining plants were about twelve to fourteen inches apart.  
August marked the start of picking season, and laborers picked cotton until around the 
new year.  During the picking season, cotton was continuously transferred to the gin 
house for refinement.  As with any crop in the nineteenth century, cotton was vulnerable 
to environmental catastrophes.  Floods, droughts, early frosts, the cotton worm, and 
tornados were some of the calamities that could befall a crop.  Frequent repair of ditches 
and canals were necessary to prevent flooding.  But, due to the length of the picking 
season, less of a need for centralized and coordinated labor, and the relatively low startup 
cost when compared to sugar, cotton was the preferred crop in Louisiana during the 
immediate post-war years.  Soil prepared for cotton planting could also be used for corn, 
with both requiring the same process, easing the economic troubles many planters found 
themselves in after the Civil War.  These factors allowed for the creation of tenancy, also 
known as sharecropping, and played a role in increased violence in country parishes 
                                                 
9
 Ninth Census of Agriculture, 1870. 
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during Reconstruction, as military intervention and federal control were limited outside 
of New Orleans and areas easily accessible by river.10 
 After failures of alternative methods of labor management on cotton plantations, 
including wage labor, planters settled on sharecropping.  Here, tenants planted on tracts 
of land owned by planters in exchange for what usually amounted to 1/3 to 1/2 of the 
crop.  Planters provided lodging, clothing, food, and often seed for those unable to 
provide their own, deducted from the tenant's share of the final product.  This practice 
allowed planters to spread risk among their laborers, as pay was directly related to the 
price received for the crop and the total yield.  But, especially in poor crop years, tenants 
could end up in debt and vulnerable to exploitation by the planters.  Planters exploited 
labor by charging tenants for costs incurred during the crop year, such as food, clothing, 
and other necessities, often charging exorbitant amounts and crippling laborers 
financially.  Poor comparable conditions were evident by 1869, when Southern black 
sharecroppers earned an average of $200 per year, while those working under wage labor 
in the sugar region earned from $325 - $350 per year.  Not only were sharecroppers 
earning less than those under wage labor, they often found themselves isolated apart from 
one another in the countryside, making them more vulnerable to violence, an important 
aspect that contributed to greater violence in cotton regions during Reconstruction.11  
 To secure a successful sugar crop, planters faced obstacles not present with 
cotton.  Sugar required meticulous care of the growing plants and a very strenuous rolling 
                                                 
10
 Donald J. Millet, ”Some Aspects of Agricultural Retardation in Southwest Louisiana, 1865-1900," 
Louisiana History 11, no. 1 (Winter, 1970), 37-61.; Charles S. Davis, The Cotton Kingdom in Alabama 
(Philadelphia: Porcupine Press, 1974), 61-65. 
11
 Ralph Shlomowitz, "The Origins of Southern Sharecropping," African American Life, 1861-1900: From 
Slavery to Sharecropping, ed. Donald Nieman (New York: Garland Publishing, inc., 1994), 199-217; 
Rodrigue, 73-75, 150. 
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season during which the crop was harvested.  Sugar crop seasons also overlapped, where 
one fifth of the crop was saved for the following year, a practice that would present 
problems after the war when planters were forced to compensate their labor force   
Experience played a large role in determining the success of a sugar crop, as the planter 
could increase the quality of cane produced by allowing it to ripen longer, but by doing 
so the chances of a frost ruining the crop also increased.  Sugar was processed on the 
plantations, a practice integrated with planting and harvesting in Louisiana on a large 
scale until the 1880's.  Because of the on-site processing, portions of the plantation's labor 
force cut the lumber necessary for this procedure and operated the refinery machinery.  In 
1822, a steam powered sugar mill became available, replacing the less efficient kettle 
furnaces.  By 1861, nearly eighty percent of Louisiana plantations used steam power to 
process their sugar.  Under strictly regimented slave labor in the antebellum years, this 
process ran relatively smoothly, barring any developments from nature.12 
 To prevent work stoppages during the rolling season, coordination between field 
and mill labor was necessary.  Due to this required coordination, quality differences 
based on ripeness of the cane and the skill of labor both in the fields and mills, the quality 
of sugar produced varied greatly even within the yield of a single plantation.  Because of 
these factors and differing seasonal tasks required in sugar production, planters realized 
that a centralized system was required to provide for an acceptable, profitable crop.  In 
the immediate postwar years, freedmen desired a system of labor that deviated from the 
gang labor prevalent under slavery.  Early labor experiments in the sugar region found 
broad success only under wage labor, as planters were able to obtain the coordinated, 
                                                 
12
 Rodrigue, 13-20, 128; J. Carlyle Sitterson, Sugar Country: The Cane Sugar Industry in the South, 1753-
1900 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1953), 138-139. 
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reliable labor force necessary if the freedmen felt that they were treated fairly and 
allowed some mobility.13 
       Recovery of Cotton and Sugar Prices During Reconstruction 
  
 
  
 
  
  
  
  
 Wartime production levels were poor throughout the Confederacy, as the 
destruction of infrastructure by Northern armies, occasional planter substitution of 
sustenance crops in the place of cash crops, and chronic labor shortages all contributed to 
the low numbers.  The fact that Louisiana's sugar economy was under federal control 
made little difference.  These low yields resulted in inflated prices that would begin to 
experience a consistent decline as production increased after the crop failures of 1866 and 
1867.  After the Civil War, economic prospects improved but not significantly, as capital 
used in gathering and refining of both crops was dilapidated, labor was transitioning from 
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 Ibid., 59-77, 84, 93, 120-125. 
14
 Numbers differ for both sugar and cotton production in the varied government reports and other sources, 
sugar moreso than cotton.  For information regarding sugar, historians Joe Gray Taylor and John C. 
Rodrigue have both accepted numbers presented by the New Orleans Daily Picayune on an annual basis 
every September 1.  Due to this historical acceptance, I will be using these numbers combined with census 
data from aggregate reports in applicable years; Joe Gray Taylor, Louisiana Reconstructed, 1863-1877 
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), 370; The standard conversion is 500 pounds/bale of 
cotton.  Cotton data compiled from "Statistics on Cotton and Related Data," Statistical Bulletin 99 
(Washington D.C., 1951), 51,53,55,150. 
 Louisiana Sugar Production 
       After the Civil War 
 Year Hogsheads Price/Hogshead 
1866 39,000 $137.50  
1867 37,647 154.00 
1868 84,256 137.80 
1869 87,090 140.00 
1870 144,881 102.26 
1871 128,461 97.16 
1872 108,529 91.68 
1873 89,496 86.50 
1874 116,867 95.82 
1875 114,146 95.90 
1876 169,331 83.00 
1877 194,964 95.50 
 Louisiana Cotton Production 
         After the Civil War14 
 Year Bales Price/Pound(cents) 
1866 131,000 32.16 
1867 167,000 24.54 
1868 248,000 28.64 
1869 351,000 25.31 
1870 567,000 17.04 
1871 337,000 21.88 
1872 503,000 20.22 
1873 454,000 17.29 
1874 536,000 15.67 
1875 689,000 13.10 
1876 564,000 11.89 
1877 586,000 11.17 
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slave to free, and ever-important levees were often in shambles.  During the post-war 
period, sugar production experienced an increased recovery time when compared to 
cotton, not nearing antebellum numbers with regularity until the 1880's, while cotton was 
able to approach these numbers by the early 1870's.  The primary differing factor in the 
sugar and cotton industries that contributed to sugar's slow recovery was that cultivation 
of a successful sugar crop required more capital than cotton.  Due to issues with capital, 
many planters were initially unable to continue operations on sugar plantations, switching 
to other crops.  In 1866, the Opelousas Courier noted that only five or six sugar planters 
out of one hundred seventy in St. Landry before the war would be planting.  Regardless 
of the accuracy behind those numbers, the decline of sugar as a profitable crop in the 
early post-war years is noteworthy.15  
 Although the state of capital, labor, credit, and infrastructure all played roles in 
decreased yields, crop failures in 1866 and 1867 were primarily caused by natural 
disasters.  Early frosts, flooding, tornados, droughts, and harmful insects were examples 
of problems that could beset a planter in nineteenth century Louisiana.  These problems 
were not new, but when combined with regional changes after the Civil War, credit and 
labor starved planters were often crippled when a natural disaster struck.  Early frosts 
could destroy entire crops.  Many levees were in poor repair after the Civil War and 
floods became a common concern throughout Louisiana.  In 1866, the Southern Sentinel 
found that it was "safe to predict an almost universal destruction of the crops" in areas of 
the state in which the Red or Mississippi rivers flowed.  Multiple tornados occurred 
during this time period, wreaking havoc on crops and infrastructure wherever they 
                                                 
15
 Opelousas Courier, 11/17/1866; Statistical Bulletin 99 (Washington D.C., 1951), 51,53,55; Sitterson, 
231-232. 
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appeared.  Insects also whittled down crop numbers, none more than the dreaded cotton 
worm, also known as the army worm.  Cotton worms appeared late in the summer, 
causing heavier damage the later the crop was cultivated.16 
 Disease was a common regional problem in subtropical, swampy Louisiana, 
including but not limited to cholera, yellow fever, and small pox.  Yellow fever was 
particularly devastating and widely feared, as regional outbreaks could tear through an 
entire community if left unchecked.  In 1853, a massive yellow fever outbreak consumed 
St. Landry Parish, resulting in an ordinance that enforced quarantine procedures.  But, 
these procedures were not as effective as was hoped and resulted in many citizens 
deserting Opelousas to avoid contamination.  The next large outbreak occurred in the late 
summer of 1867, in the midst of regional crop failures, a destroyed Southern economy, 
and a contested transition from slave to free labor.  On August 10, the Opelousas Board 
of Police revised the 1853 quarantine ordinance to remove any infected individuals from 
the town limits, prohibit shipping through waterways, and prevent any travel or trade 
with the town of Washington, where the disease was declared to be an "epidemic."  The 
Opelousas Relief Association formed on October 6 to combat the disease, which was 
composed out of the St. Landry Police Jury and included prominent Democrats that 
would play a role in the 1868 massacre, such as Charles Thompson, a local businessman, 
and Felix King, later to become the mayor of Opelousas.  Despite the optimistic claims of 
the Opelousas Courier that the city of Opelousas remained relatively unscathed, reports 
of yellow fever deaths appeared with regularity.  In fact, just as in 1853, many in charge 
of enforcing the quarantine and operating the Opelousas Relief Association simply fled 
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 Southern Sentinel, 6/2/1866; Opelousas Courier, 7/27/1867, 2/1/1868. 
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the town to a safer area, leaving the citizens without adequate protection from the 
disease.17 
 Internal improvements were a constant concern for residents of St. Landry Parish, 
but goals regarding upkeep were rarely realized due to problems such as labor shortages 
and funding deficiencies.  Inadequate protection against fire was a common complaint of 
parish residents, who had experienced over a dozen fires during the previous decade.  The 
Opelousas Fire Company reformed in late 1865 after several years of no operation.  
However, fears had not been alleviated by the reappearance of the fire company, as one 
parish resident called for an investigation of dwellings within the city limits of 
Opelousas.  This resident believed that improperly placed stoves and chimneys posed an 
"imminent danger" to the safety of the inhabitants within.  Fire safety was not the only 
concern regarding parish infrastructure, for parish roads and bridges were often in poor 
condition and greatly hindered travel.18   
 Proper upkeep of roads and bridges was necessary for intra-parish travel and for 
the transportation of goods to New Orleans, as the inability to get goods to market could 
spell disaster for planters.  St. Landry had trouble maintaining its roads before the Civil 
War, but by the final stretches of the conflict more issues became apparent.  In early 
1865, the Opelousas Courier complained about how the devaluation of Confederate 
currency reduced the tax revenue to 1/20 of pre-war levels.  Poor levee repair increased 
regional flooding, which in turn washed out and destroyed many roads and bridges.  Road 
overseers, appointed to maintain roads, and plantation hands were often sent as labor for 
this work under threat of a fine, but their effectiveness was not permanent and was 
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usually limited to roads benefiting the planters that provided the labor.  Conditions had 
not improved by 1867, with one local newspaper declaring that only the "rash 
adventurer" would dare to traverse the muddy road between Opelousas and nearby 
Washington, located six miles north.  Bridges necessary for travel within the parish were 
also in constant need of repair.  In 1867, the St. Landry Toll Bridge Company was 
created to maintain multiple bridges within the parish and installed a toll system for 
funding.  This company was led by influential men in the parish, including Elbert Gantt, 
president of the police jury, Yves D'Avy, parish recorder, and Thomas C. Anderson, a 
state senator from 1864-1866 and 1868-1877 who was able to consolidate power in St. 
Landry after the 1868 massacre.19 
 Levees along the Mississippi and Red Rivers had also gone largely neglected 
during the Civil War, causing floods that destroyed infrastructure and a significant 
number of crops.  After the war, ventures to repair these levees were often short-term and 
poorly done, as funding and adequate labor were difficult to obtain.  In 1866, a Louisiana 
Board of Levee Commissioners was created to oversee levee works.  Fear of floods 
caused by levee breaks and anticipation of successful repairs permeated newspapers 
during the 1860's, but how and by whom the repairs would be completed presented a 
problem for poorly funded local and state governments.  Due to the intense labor required 
to maintain and repair the levees, many freedmen required higher pay to do these jobs.  
Some freedmen that desired increased mobility without a binding contract became 
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jobbers, taking work at plantations that regular hands did not want, such as levee 
maintenance and woodcutting.20 
 Although economic hardships, disease, and natural disasters were all influential in 
the lives of Southern whites, the fate of the newly emancipated slaves was their foremost 
concern.  Along with the threat of black suffrage, the most significant change facing 
planters and freedmen during the initial post-war years was the transition from slave to 
free labor.  The Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands was created in 
1865 to aid freedmen in the transition from slavery to freedom by providing legal 
protection, schooling, medical aid, and relief for indigent citizens.  The Freedmen's 
Bureau also provided planters with farming implements and seed in exchange for a crop 
lien, oversaw labor contracts, and controlled apportionment of confiscated land.  
However, President Andrew Johnson's leniency with the defeated Confederate 
landholders limited the Bureau's effectiveness; many of these apportionments were 
returned to the previous Confederate owners, discouraging freedmen who had hoped for 
the fulfillment of "forty acres and a mule."  The Bureau also suffered from a chronic lack 
of adequate funding, as evidenced by their inability to provide relief during the winter of 
1866-67.  Additional funds to the indigent citizens of Louisiana were discontinued on 
August 20, 1867, leaving many without support in the face of another crop failure.21   
 After emancipation, freedmen generally desired increased autonomy and rights in 
the workplace while planters wanted increased control similar to that which they held in 
the antebellum years.  Compromise and struggle between freedman autonomy and planter 
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control became the norm during Reconstruction, from which multiple strategies evolved 
in order to attain results.  Economic advancement by the freedmen was seen by Southern 
Democrats as disastrous to the preferred antebellum social hierarchy and attempts to 
prevent this were central to Southern actions. The total labor force decreased after 
emancipation, as women generally left the fields and tended to matters at home.  
Freedmen in general proved reluctant to return to the plantation, especially under gang 
labor, and after the Civil War Southern cities experienced a large influx of those who 
wished to earn a living without working the fields.  Due to the decreased labor pool and 
freedmen resistance to working similar hours to what they worked as slaves, a labor 
shortage plagued the South in the post-war years, leading to planter competition for the 
scarce resource.  If one planter offered better pay or living conditions, freedmen would 
often leave their prior employer, an act that could prove crippling to total production if 
the crop was ready for harvest. 
 This led to planter resistance and even an act passed by the Louisiana legislature 
on December 21, 1865 to prevent labor enticement by rival planters, enforced by a fine 
and potential prison time.  Legislation such as this constituted the Black Codes, enacted 
in 1865 and 1866.  The Black Codes were an attempt to control labor by restricting the 
freedmen's movement and limiting their economic opportunities.  Louisiana's Black 
Codes reflected white fears and desires regarding the newly emancipated slaves.  
Freedmen were to remain unarmed, vagrancy laws passed circumscribing freedpeople's 
movement, compulsory apprenticeship measures were enacted for children whose parents 
were deemed unfit, and measures were taken to limit labor enticement.  Some of these 
laws, especially regarding vagrancy, were influential in forming the convict lease system 
  
18 
that would plague the South in the latter part of the century, stating that if the offender 
could not pay the fine, lawmen could "detain and hire out a vagrant for a period not 
exceeding twelve months." The primary function of the Black Codes was to create a 
reliable labor force comprised of freedmen.  Codes installed by individual states were 
often vague, not specifically mentioning freedmen as their targets, attempting to be 
discreet and avoid Northern suspicions.  But, Southern states had indeed become the 
masters of former slaves and local governments were often more direct in their approach 
to compelling black labor.22   
 In Opelousas, some of the most extreme measures nationwide in controlling the 
black labor force were found.  On July 3, 1865, the Opelousas Board of Police approved 
an ordinance pertaining to rights of freedmen within the city limits.  The restrictive 
ordinance required freedmen to acquire passes from their employers if they were to enter 
the city, set a curfew at 10:00 p.m., and forbade freedmen to take up residence in town, 
carry firearms, or hold public meetings.  The clauses pertaining to the freedmen's rights 
to carry firearms and hold public meetings highlighted concerns held by the Southern 
whites that would come to the forefront in Radical Reconstruction.  In 1865, and through 
Reconstruction, a primary desire held by planters was to get the freedmen back to work 
on plantations, preferably under the same terms as slavery.  The Opelousas Courier 
found these measures to be necessary, citing "indolence and idleness bordering on 
vagrancy" of the freedmen and an uncertainty in regard to whether the freedmen would 
change employers once they had the opportunity to do so.  Due to a national outcry, 
represented by a mention in Carl Schurz's Report on the Condition of the South and 
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attacks by T.W. Conway, Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau in Louisiana, the 
ordinance was never enforced.  As the political landscape changed with the 1866 Civil 
Rights Bill and the beginning of Radical Reconstruction in early 1867, many state 
governments were forced to abandon some of the more discriminatory sections of the 
Black Codes.  Hence, planters searched for alternative means to remedy the "labor 
problem."23 
 Another method taken by planters to control labor was through contract fraud.  
Initial labor contracts bound freedmen to the plantation for the planting year, but these 
were generally resisted.  Freedmen and their allies desired monthly payment schedules, 
which were attained as planters realized that some form of accommodation was necessary 
in order to secure a profitable crop.  Radical papers such as the New Orleans Tribune 
promoted these short contracts, preaching that long contracts were "intended by the 
employer to renew a servitude or bondage."  One planter was astonished when a 
freedman complained that it was "not like freedom" and a breach of contract for his cabin 
to be entered with the intruder telling him to "get up."  These contracts often limited 
mobility, created economic sanctions for missing work, and sometimes provided 
measures for the planters to keep the freedmen in perpetual debt.  General stores on 
plantations, owned by planters, were often exploitative by charging freedmen egregious 
prices for goods.  In both sugar and cotton regions, a portion of wages were typically held 
until the end of the year to ensure freedmen labor throughout the year.  Federal 
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organizations such as the Freedmen's Bureau and Union League combated this contract 
fraud and frustrated planters in the process.24  
 An important role of the Freedmen's Bureau was to help freedmen avoid 
fraudulent labor contracts.  Although the Bureau focused on the welfare of freedmen, it 
was also cognizant of Southern post-war realities in that planter cooperation was 
necessary.   During its lifetime, the Bureau attempted to secure fair contracts while 
providing the stable labor force desired by planters.  On December 4, 1865, the Louisiana 
Freedmen's Bureau set regulations on labor contracts for the state.  These regulations 
stipulated that all binding labor contracts pass Bureau inspection, set standards of ten 
hour days and twenty-six day work months before overtime pay, reserved Sundays for 
religious observation, and included the requirement of monthly pay schedules.  Labor 
was to be provided with housing, food, and clothing.  If desired by both parties, food and 
clothing could be purchased from a plantation store at "usual market rates" to prevent 
price gouging.  To provide a secure labor force for planters, the local Bureau agent set 
and enforced economic sanctions for labor that refused to work.  To supplement limited 
funding received by the Bureau, five percent of all payments to labor would be 
appropriated to Bureau schools.  Although these regulations made it more difficult for 
planters to exploit the labor force through contract examination and labor dispute 
arbitration, they were not comprehensive due to limited Bureau funding, manpower, and 
the vast amount of complaints received.25 
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 By 1866, the Freedmen's Bureau required an extension to continue operations in 
the South, as the original bill only stipulated for a year of existence.  However, President 
Johnson vetoed this bill on February 19, citing unconstitutionality and an increase in 
federal power that was unnecessary during a time of peace.  Johnson's decision to veto an 
extended life for the Bureau was received with shock and represented continued 
disaffection between Radical Republicans and the president.  After the second 
Freedmen's Bureau Bill successfully passed over Johnson's veto on July 3, the Civil 
Rights Act of 1866 faced a similar struggle.  The primary function of the Civil Rights Act 
was to grant freedmen citizenship and equality before the law.  However, the bill did not 
include suffrage rights, a prospect that was not possible until early 1867.  The Civil 
Rights Act passed through the House and Senate in early April 1866, but was returned 
after a presidential veto.  Johnson and his conservative supporters' main argument behind 
this veto was its alleged unconstitutionality, in that it "establish(es) for the security of the 
colored race safeguards which go indefinitely beyond any...for the white race."  Defying 
Johnson's stance on the bill, Congress passed it a second time.  With Southern 
newspapers now decidedly pro-Johnson and many moderate Republicans siding with the 
Radicals as a result of the two 1866 vetoes, the split between Congress and the President 
would only widen by the official start of Radical Reconstruction with the Reconstruction 
Acts of March, 1867.26 
 Illustrating Southern resistance against reconstruction measures, two large scale 
instances of violence occurred in 1866, both involving local white police forces and black 
Union army veterans.  The first major act of collective violence in the Reconstruction Era 
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occurred in Memphis, Tennessee.  In April, 1866, tension rose in Memphis as discharged 
black Union troops returned home, resulting in scattered cases of violence between these 
troops and the local police force.27  By the end of the month, violence instigated by the 
white, mostly Irish, police force escalated to the point where it was not safe for a black 
person to leave the safety of their home.  On May 1, a group of freedmen gathered and 
exhibited "riotous and disorderly" behavior, but did not cause any harm to those around 
them.  But, the group erred in shooting their guns in the air after chasing a group of 
Memphis policemen, resulting in a small skirmish.  The House report on the Memphis 
Riot found the threat of rioting by the local black population to be gone after May 1, but 
on May 2 a white mob formed and "commenced an indiscriminate robbery, burning, and 
slaughter" of freedmen and their property that lasted three days.  The House report found 
that forty-six freedmen and two whites had died, large property damage incurred, and 
several rapes had been committed.  Violence against freedmen in an effort to exert 
control was more economically viable to planters after the Civil War, as emancipation 
had eliminated their value as property.28 
 Shortly after the Memphis Riot, on July 30, 1866, New Orleans experienced a 
similar outbreak of violence.  This conflict was the result of a power struggle between 
Governor James Madison Wells and the so-called "Rebel Legislature" of Louisiana.  
Elected in 1865, this Louisiana legislative body contained large numbers of ex-
Confederates, enough to make an impact on politics in the state.  To emphasize the 
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political inclination of this legislature, an excerpt from the Opelousas Courier (Dem.) 
reads: "the (ex-Confederates) who had been ejected from their offices by the Governor 
since the war, were and are the choice of the people."  To regain control, Governor Wells 
attempted to reconvene the convention of 1864 to disenfranchise the ex-Confederates and 
to institute black suffrage.  There was no quorum on the first attempt to reconvene, June 
26, and the second attempt fell on July 30.  On the morning of July 30, fearing white 
resistance to the proposed tenants of the convention, around two hundred black Union 
veterans marched to the Mechanics Institute, where the convention was to be held.  By 
this time a large crowd had gathered outside on the streets.  Many of these black veterans 
entered the building and barricaded the doors after the local police force shot at them.  
Policemen then fired into the building, killing numerous freedmen.  A House report 
estimated for there to have been thirty-eight deaths.  Investigative committees seem to 
have been generally low in their estimates of casualties, as bodies were often disposed of 
or buried by those close to the victim in secrecy.  The same investigation found evidence 
of premeditation, where the mayor of New Orleans was "determined...to break up this 
convention by armed force."29 
 Both of these massacres were related to the return of black Union soldiers to 
hostile environments, but the focus of violence shifted after the summer of 1866.  
Republican discontent with Andrew Johnson had risen drastically after the Freedmen's 
Bureau Bill and Civil Rights Act vetoes of early 1866.  If black populations were able to 
vote, to the dismay of most white Southerners, the South could conceivably be controlled 
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by the will of its black citizens.  After the New Orleans Riot of 1866, and especially after 
the First Reconstruction Act, racial violence focused on controlling the political sphere.  
Methods of controlling black labor had largely failed to this point and the chance of the 
president restoring the "white man's government" was becoming less plausible with an 
increasingly radical Congress.  In late 1866, Johnson went on a campaigning tour of the 
North, known as the "Swing Around the Circle," during which he fomented political 
hostility.  At one point during the tour he blamed Congress for the New Orleans Riot and 
failed to mention the Fourteenth Amendment, proposed in July but facing difficulties in 
ratification.  These speeches only bred additional Republican discontent towards the 
president.  1866 was the turning point in Johnson's presidency and his Swing Around the 
Circle marked the unofficial end of Presidential Reconstruction.30  
 On March 3, 1867, the first of four Reconstruction Acts passed.  With the First 
Reconstruction Act, Radical, or Military, Reconstruction officially began.  The bill 
organized five military districts to keep order in the South, with Louisiana and Texas 
forming the fifth under General Philip H. Sheridan's command.  Current state 
governments were deemed to be provisionary until new state constitutions were formed 
that allowed universal male suffrage.  Until the new state constitutions were accepted as 
adequate, Southern states were not allowed to reenter the Union.  Supplements to the 
First Reconstruction Act stipulated registration and constitution convention election 
deadlines and guidelines, clarified power held by district commanders, and closed off 
loopholes present with the prior acts, such as registering but abstaining from voting in the 
convention ratification elections.  The Reconstruction Acts faced massive Southern 
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opposition and the first act was vetoed by President Johnson, but Congress passed over 
the veto without hesitation.31 
 In the Union League, an organization created during the Civil War, membership 
exploded after the passage of the Reconstruction Acts in March, 1867.  Leagues across 
the South held public meetings for the political education of the freedmen, examined 
labor contracts for fairness, and provided other essential services to the mass of 
uneducated ex-slaves.  The main purpose of Union Leagues was to serve as a "Radical 
caucus," and focused much more extensively on political affairs than the Freedmen's 
Bureau.  Along with the Freedmen's Bureau, Union Leagues aided in the evolution of 
free labor during the postwar years by attempting to secure fair contracts while providing 
the stable labor force desired by planters.  As freedmen became more politically 
informed, their desire for political office also rose, creating conflict between planters and 
Union Leagues across the South.  The mere thought of an ex-slave in a position of power 
evoked disgust in many paternalistically oriented Southern minds.  Many Southerners 
also blamed organizations such as the Union League and Freedmen's Bureau for instilling 
illusions of upward social movement in the freedmen and inciting insurrection.  Union 
Leagues worked particularly well in sugar parishes, as the laborers were in much closer 
proximity to one another in comparison to cotton parishes using sharecropping.  The peak 
of League influence lasted until the 1868 presidential election, where violence largely 
destroyed its structure and greatly diminished its effectiveness for the remainder of 
Reconstruction.32  
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 With the passage of the Reconstruction acts, freedmen became more aggressive in 
asserting their rights and planters were forced into attempting different methods of 
control as regional Republican power grew.  Freedman participation in the political 
sphere increased with the coming of universal suffrage and Democratic rhetoric changed 
as a result.  Freedmen occasionally missed work in order to attend political meetings and 
rallies, angering planters greatly.  Southerners were beginning to feel as if "the world 
(was) all armed against" them.  Southern conservatives targeted Radicals for giving 
"incendiary speeches" to incite freedmen into an uprising.33  In late 1867, the Opelousas 
Courier printed an article claiming that "leaders are familiarizing the minds of these 
negroes with the idea of blood, firearms, confiscation, robbery, and plunder...Their 
teachings are calculated to make the negroes dissatisfied with honest labor and the white 
race."  The fact that freedmen formed militias and performed armed drills, a practice 
criticized by Union League officials in fear of a white response, only increased racial 
tension.  White fear of a black insurrection was a powerful driving force behind many 
actions taken in the era and would occasionally end in what perpetrators believed was 
preventative violence.  Southern Democrats attempted several methods to control the 
black population in politics and in labor, including through economic intimidation.34 
 To create uniformity in practice and solidarity amongst themselves, planters 
regularly held meetings.  In early November 1867, planters from Avoyelles and Rapides 
parishes, both bordering St. Landry Parish to the north, adopted a resolution regarding 
labor.  These planters preferred flexible wages, where rates were set and labor was paid 
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upon sale of the crop instead of on a monthly basis.  They also refused to hire labor that 
voted the Republican ticket or joined a Union League, arguing for such men to "exhibit a 
hostile purpose to our interest."  Republican labor in cotton regions usually experienced 
lesser stability than in sugar regions, as cotton production was less intensive than sugar 
year-round and a higher turnover rate was less damaging to overall yield.  Southern white 
Republicans were also targeted economically and boycotting was especially effective due 
to the relatively low white Republican presence in the region.  Michael W. Fitzgerald, the 
prominent Union League scholar, found that freedmen still joined Union Leagues and 
voted Republican, regardless of economic repercussions.35 
 Planters also attempted to control the labor force through conversion to the 
Democratic Party.  Rhetoric directed at freedmen often reflected paternalistic values 
while directly attacking Republican organizations and Southern Radicals, who had 
"poisoned" the minds of freedmen against planters and Southern Democrats.  Judge 
Cullon of Avoyelles Parish produced a series of letters during the summer of 1867 "To 
Colored Voters" that were reproduced in regional Democratic papers.  The function of 
these letters were to "instruct you and protect you from designing men" who had 
slandered Democrats and fabricated information about the Democratic desire to return to 
slavery.  Instead, Judge Cullon claimed, the Democratic Party fully supported the 
"general welfare" of the freedmen.  Democrats also held mass meetings and barbeques 
"without distinction to race or color" preceding political events to garner votes.  
However, these attempts at conversion often refrained from mentioning or lied about key 
tenants of the Democratic Party, such as their stance on racial equality.36  
                                                 
35
 Opelousas Courier, 12/7/1867; Fitzgerald, 207-211. 
36
 Opelousas Courier, 5/25/1867, 7/6/1867, 7/13/1867, 11/30/1867; Opelousas Journal, 7/25/1868. 
  
28 
 One Democratic solution to the question of labor was immigration.  After the end 
of the Civil War, planters proposed immigration to supplement the labor force, often 
focusing on Asian immigrants, derogatorily referred to as "coolies."  The Opelousas 
Courier printed a sample contract for coolie labor in late 1865, requiring the laborer to 
"bind" themselves for 5 years for whatever task their employer desired, abide by work 
days and hours according to the "custom of the region," and face fines for work missed, 
while planters provided food and shelter.  Planters were generally discontented with the 
status of freedmen labor and coolies were targeted next, most likely due to reports of 
success from California.  Although immigration as a solution had been present in 
Louisiana during the early Reconstruction years, the movement took off after the 
beginning of Radical Reconstruction.  By early 1868, the Immigration Society of St. 
Landry Parish formed for the purpose of attracting immigration broadly, without a 
mention of racial guidelines. That same year the Opelousas Journal printed a series of 
geographical descriptions of the parish, focusing on its "bountiful" wealth and availability 
of resources, articles designed for those not living in the region.  Unsurprisingly, Asiatic 
labor immigration to Louisiana was not successful on a large scale, as harsh working 
conditions generally served as a deterrent.  Overall foreign immigration was unsuccessful 
as well, as St. Landry Parish contained 305 people who were foreign born in 1860 (1.3% 
of total population in the parish), 518 in 1870 (2.0%), and 529 in 1880 (1.3%).37 
 Under the guidelines of the Reconstruction acts, from September 27-28, 1867, a 
vote was held to decide if Louisiana should have a convention and to elect delegates 
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should the first vote prove successful.  These elections took place in the midst of a 
regional yellow fever outbreak, a distraction that may have limited total votes cast.  Voter 
turnout on the Democratic side was low, as regional blacks were expected to vote for the 
constitution and for Republican candidates, resulting in low projections for a Democratic 
victory.  The vote for a convention was an overwhelming success for Republicans in 
Louisiana, with St. Landry Parish realizing a 2,351-33 vote in favor.  The election of 
delegates was a Republican victory in terms of representation, with 86 of the total 98 
delegates being Republican.  Louisiana's black population was also represented, as a 
convention in June 1867 stipulated that half of the delegates were to be black.  Radical 
James G. Taliaferro was elected president of the convention, the man who would oppose 
Henry Clay Warmoth in the gubernatorial election of 1868.  In St. Landry, the list of 
delegates featured most of the influential Republicans in the parish, including George H. 
Jackson (freedman), Auguste Donato, Jr. (homme de couleur) 38, Michael Vidal (white, 
editor of the St. Landry Progress), and J.G. Drinkard (white, local druggist).39   
   By the end of 1867, blacks and Radicals both in the North and South were 
optimistic about future prospects.  Universal suffrage was imminent, conditions at work 
had improved, and the men in charge of shaping Louisiana's new state constitution were 
overwhelmingly supportive of their wants.  As the education of freedmen increased with 
the aid of federal agencies after Radical Reconstruction began in 1867, wages and 
working conditions also improved.  Strikes began to appear with more regularity and 
planters were forced into necessary concessions in order to secure a reliable labor force, 
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such as a broader acceptance of monthly pay schedules.  After the Reconstruction acts, 
progress in labor conditions for freedmen was consistently seen for the remainder of the 
period.    
 However, Democrats and most white Southerners had not only encountered defeat 
at the hands of those now reorganizing the South, but many had lost a large portion of the 
wealth they had accumulated in antebellum years.  After two devastating crop failures, 
many planters who had relied on crop liens were deep in debt.  As a result, black labor in 
constant danger of not being paid by unwilling or unable planters during these hard 
economic times.  Political reverses had changed Democratic newspaper rhetoric to that of 
a defeated nation and exhibited a fear of subjugation at Northern hands.  1868 would fare 
no better for these Southerners, as a Republican governor was elected in Louisiana, their 
presidential ally in Andrew Johnson was rendered mostly powerless and was nearly 
impeached, the Fourteenth Amendment passed, and universal suffrage would be realized.  
To this point, Democratic attempts at labor control, through legislation, contract fraud, 
economic intimidation, and conversion had all largely failed.  1868 featured the first 
national election of Reconstruction and a Southern hope that a Democratic victory would 
return the region to the antebellum status quo.  To secure these results, violence and 
intimidation were used as means.  
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Chapter II 
The Redemption of St. Landry Parish 
 
 The First Reconstruction Act of March, 1867 represented a considerable setback 
in Southern aspirations to return to the antebellum racial hierarchy.  As prior attempts by 
Southerners had been largely unsuccessful in gaining this, new approaches were 
attempted.  Democratic secret societies began to form in mid-1867 with the purpose of 
restoring the "white man's government" and preventing further reconstruction measures.  
Setbacks to Southern ambitions occurred on the national level in 1868 with the near-
impeachment of President Andrew Johnson, the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
and the completion of many constitutional conventions that provided universal male 
suffrage.  With increasing frequency but escalating as the 1868 presidential election 
neared, these secret societies utilized violence and intimidation to elect a Democratic 
president who would support Southern desires. 
 Throughout the South, but primarily in Louisiana and Georgia, large scale 
collective violence occurred in 1868 from late September through the November 3 
presidential election that often crippled the regional Republican Party.  As Republican 
newspapers were often destroyed during the uprisings and Democratic newspapers 
generally only explained one side of the story, an army report and testimonies represent 
the majority of sources available on the pre-election violence and intimidation in 
Louisiana.  From mid-September through the election, Army Lieutenant Jesse M. Lee 
was sent to Louisiana to investigate the violence, after which he produced a report that 
detailed large acts of violence and estimated total casualties.  In December, 1868 and 
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May, 1869, a House committee took testimony regarding occurrences during the electoral 
period.  During the election, armed Democratic guards were frequently found at the polls 
and anyone who voted the Republican ticket often found their life in danger.  Violence 
and intimidation were effective on the state level and provided Horatio Seymour (Dem.) 
with victories in both Louisiana and Georgia, but Ulysses S. Grant (Rep.) was still able to 
secure the national nomination.  As the largest and arguably the most effective racial 
massacre for long term Democratic prospects during Reconstruction, the St. Landry 
Massacre is representative of the change in Democratic strategy experienced after the 
1867 Reconstruction Acts. 
 On March 9, 1868, the Louisiana constitutional convention adjourned and 
presented a new state constitution, labeled "The Negro Constitution" by the Opelousas 
Courier (Dem.), that followed the regulations set forth by the 1867 Reconstruction Acts.  
The votes both to accept the constitution and to elect civil officials for the state took place 
simultaneously, from April 17-18, 1868.  The new state constitution, Louisiana's first to 
include a bill of rights, contained clauses providing for male enfranchisement for those 
over 21 years old, equal access to state run schools, a requirement for every parish to 
contain at least one school, and equality in public places and transportation, all "without 
regard to race, color, or previous condition."  However, requirements stipulated by the 
new constitution were hardly followed.  Instead, Southern Democrats attempted to 
circumvent the requirements and gain control of the black vote through intimidation and 
violence.40 
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 The vote for the new state constitution passed with ease in April, at 66,152-
48,739.  During the Reconstruction era, voting practices usually went along color lines, 
as white men generally voted Democrat while black men punched the Republican ticket.  
Of the parishes that experienced large scale collective violence preceding the November 
elections of 1868, Caddo, Orleans, and St. Landry parishes held majorities against the 
constitution while Bossier and Jefferson parishes realized small victories for the 
constitution.  As the St. Landry Republican Party formed in April, 1867, most whites who 
had been in the parish for any significant amount of time favored the Democratic Party 
and opposed further reconstruction measures.  The results of the vote for the new 
constitution in April, 1868, illustrated this opposition, where only 32 whites voted in 
favor compared to 358 black votes against.  These votes were important, as turnout for 
the vote consisted of 2,635 black men and 2,298 white men.  The vote for the constitution 
failed in St. Landry, 2,624-2,309.  In Louisiana, Republicans emerged victorious in the 
vote for the constitution and in the April elections for public officials, gaining a majority 
in the state's legislature.  But a Democratic victory on the local level in St. Landry Parish 
foreshadowed the political turmoil that would envelop the parish later that year.  This 
local victory also stood as a clear indication that Democrats - former Confederate 
political leaders, soldiers, and sympathizers - had not relinquished their cause.41  
 During the April elections, Democrats had little hope of a victory on the state 
level, as newly enfranchised freedmen were expected to unanimously vote Republican 
and Democrats could not expect the same political solidarity among the whites, 
especially in New Orleans, where the federal presence was more stable.  At the time, 
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Louisiana contained nearly equal white and black populations, by the next census 
counting 362,065 whites and 364,210 blacks.  With suffrage, this large black population 
represented a new and immediate threat to advocates of white political supremacy.  Ill-
prepared for universal male suffrage, the Democratic convention refrained from choosing 
a ticket due to both what one Democratic newspaper called "a want of organization for 
the Conservatives throughout the state" and a general feeling that the Republicans would 
win easily.42   
 Even with no Democratic ticket, the Republican Party split into two factions, one 
backing Henry Clay Warmoth and the other James Taliaferro.  In St. Landry Parish, the 
split occurred along two lines, within the Progress and the black population.  Roudanez, 
the homme de couleur editor of the Radical New Orleans Tribune, desired Taliaferro as a 
candidate and drew the support of Casimier Edme Durand, the French editor of the St. 
Landry Progress (Rep.).  The Taliaferro faction won the support of the local hommes de 
couleur and ran against Henry Clay Warmoth, who was supported by Emerson Bentley 
and the local freedmen.  Warmoth won convincingly, with 64,941 votes to Taliaferro's 
38,046.  In St. Landry Parish, Warmoth received 2,514 votes, Taliaferro 649, and Joshua 
Baker (Dem.), the previous governor, received 1,187.43  As an example of the era’s 
brilliant efforts at racial democracy, Oscar J. Dunn, a homme de couleur, secured the 
position of Lieutenant Governor.  Democrats mostly swept St. Landry Parish, in part due 
to the Republican split, although most Republican votes seem to have gone to the homme 
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de couleur candidate over freedmen or white Republicans in hopes of defeating the 
Democratic nominees.44  
St. Landry Parish was located in the Third Congressional district of Louisiana, 
consisting of Lafayette, St. Landry, St. Martin, St. Mary, and Vermillion parishes, which 
elected two Democratic state senators in 1868.  St. Landry sent four Democrats to the 
state House, leaving Republicans with no representatives from the parish in either the 
Louisiana House or Senate.  One of the men who won a state senatorial seat was Thomas 
C. Anderson (Dem.), whose narrow victory over local Republican homme de couleur 
leader Auguste Donate, Jr. was traced by one historian as the base on which Anderson 
built his local power structure.  The positions of district and parish judgeships, sheriff, 
recorder, district court clerk, assessor, and coroner all went to Democratic candidates in 
St. Landry, albeit by slim margins.  While their power on the statewide level had 
diminished, the April elections proved to be beneficial to the long-term success of the 
Democratic party in the region.  After the state elections, the Opelousas Courier (Dem.) 
described the upcoming presidential election as crucial, calling all voters who opposed 
Radical "Congressional usurpation and negro supremacy" to vote the Democratic ticket.45 
 After emancipation, freedmen lost their status as valued property that they 
previously held as slaves.  Consequently, violence was prone to occur at much higher 
rates against freedmen, as evidenced by the Memphis and New Orleans riots of 1866.  
While freedmen were murdered with regularity throughout the Reconstruction period, 
incidence rates increased after the First Reconstruction Act passed in early 1867.  After 
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the Reconstruction Act, universal male suffrage was imminent and Southern Democrats 
realized that in order to secure political victories, the black vote had to be influenced in 
some way.  As previous methods of enticement away from the Republican Party had 
largely failed, Democrats increasingly turned to violence and intimidation to secure 
Democratic political superiority.  Democratic newspapers generally did not mention these 
acts of violence and local law enforcement was apathetic for the most part, leaving the 
relatively rare Republican newspapers to reveal these crimes.   
On August 3, 1867, the St. Landry Progress (Rep.) posted a list of murders and 
other violent acts against freedmen in the parish.  A revised list complete with refutations 
from the Opelousas Courier (Dem.) was published on August 24.46  32 incidents were 
found in these issues, most involving the murder of freedmen, and according to the 
Progress, "in no case, those crimes were avenged by Justice."  The Courier cited an 
absence of charges in multiple cases and claimed a lack of knowledge in others, in one 
instance stating that "no clue has yet been arrived at."  The Progress retorted with "nor no 
clue could be obtained until diligence is used."  An unwillingness to prosecute offenders 
both in the local courts and with local law enforcement proved to be an effective weapon 
in the Southern white arsenal during the Reconstruction Era, especially in country 
parishes where military intervention was unlikely.47  
 Republican editors like Emerson Bentley were common targets for this violence 
and intimidation, as these men often became local leaders for the Republican Party.  
Bentley was born on July 15, 1850 in Columbiana County, Ohio.  His father was a soldier 
in the Fourth Wisconsin Regiment and became a dentist in New Orleans after the war.  A 
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precocious youth, Emerson exhibited an early interest in journalism and politics.  From 
1860-1863, Bentley procured an apprenticeship at the Jefferson County Republican, a 
small Wisconsin newspaper.  After the paper became defunct in late 1863, he returned to 
Ohio as a compositor for the Salem Republican, remaining there until the end of the war.  
After the Civil War, still in his mid-teens, Bentley made his first appearance in Louisiana.  
While in Louisiana, Bentley was forced to relocate often, as his radical tendencies did not 
mix well with the predominantly white Democratic communities.48 
 In 1866, Bentley was employed as a compositor for the New Orleans Tribune, 
where he remained until he returned to Ohio for school later that year.  In 1867, Bentley 
returned to Louisiana permanently as a Freedmen's Bureau agent assigned to be a 
schoolteacher in St. Mary Parish.  Emerson's brother, Linden, was also a Freedmen's 
Bureau agent, sent to Opelousas.  However, Emerson's assignment in St. Mary Parish was 
short-lived, as the cotton worm destroyed a large portion of the crop.  Due to this crop 
failure, planters were either unwilling or unable to pay labor.  As wages for Bureau 
agents were provided by a tax on wages received by labor, Bentley was not paid and 
subsequently quit.49   
While working for the Tribune, Bentley met Michel Vidal, a Frenchman.  Vidal 
was experienced as an editor, having worked in numerous French-Canadian newspapers, 
the New York Messenger, and the New Orleans Tribune.  In August, 1867, Vidal formed 
the St. Landry Progress, a Republican paper owned by black stockholders. While at his 
post as a teacher in St. Mary Parish, Bentley wrote several articles for the Progress.  Due 
to his acquaintance with Vidal and with Linden's insistence, Bentley became its editor 
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after Vidal left for the state constitutional convention in November.  The Progress was 
published in English and French, with Casimier Edme Durand as the French editor.50 
 On March 2, 1867, the same day that the first of the Reconstruction Acts passed, 
the Tenure of Office Act emerged, and this legislation also became the target of a failed 
presidential veto.  The Tenure of Office Act was designed to prevent the removal of any 
presidentially appointed government official by the president without Senatorial consent.  
However, President Andrew Johnson found a loophole in the act by early 1868, where the 
president could suspend an official while Congress was not in session.  In his capacity as 
Secretary of War, Edward M. Stanton held control of the selection of military officials in 
the military districting that came as a part of the Reconstruction Acts.  In August, 1867, 
Johnson suspended Stanton from his office while Congress was not in session.  This act 
roused Republican fears, which one historian described as a "fear of a coup, of a new 
civil war, of rival armies, one serving the president and one serving Congress."  On 
February 21, 1868, Johnson removed Stanton, violating the Tenure of Office Act that he 
himself had failed to prevent.  This action was enough for Johnson's opposition to mount 
an impeachment campaign, creating yet another source of sectional tension throughout 
the nation.51 
 Johnson's impeachment trial began on March 30, 1868, containing eleven articles 
of impeachment.  Of these, nine were related to Stanton's removal and the other two dealt 
with his intransigence towards Congress.  The trial hung as a specter over the nation 
during the spring of 1868 and as time progressed Johnson's position improved.  As 
Johnson had gained the presidency through the death of his predecessor, the president pro 
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tem, Radical Benjamin Wade, was next in line.  Wade was not a desirable option to many 
moderate Republicans, which drew votes away from a successful impeachment.  On May 
16, 1868, the Senate voted on the eleventh article of impeachment, the closest to an all-
encompassing summary of charges.  The result was thirty-five votes for impeachment 
and sixteen against, just one vote short of the required thirty-six for a two-thirds majority.  
On May 26, the session adjourned, giving Johnson a victory and the retention of his 
presidency.  However, by this point any support in Congress had been lost and any hope 
of effective legislative action by Johnson for the remainder of his term was slim.52 
 In addition to the impeachment troubles for Johnson, the Fourteenth Amendment 
was ratified on July 9, 1868.  Originally passed on June 13, 1866, around the time of the 
second Freedmen's Bureau Bill and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Fourteenth 
Amendment faced difficulties in the ratification process.  In 1866, every Southern state 
except for Tennessee strongly opposed the amendment and refused to ratify, leaving 
many issues addressed in the amendment to appear in the 1867 Reconstruction Acts.  By 
1868, the Reconstruction Acts had largely sapped conservative strength in the South, and 
on July 9, a three-fourths majority was gained with twenty-eight states ratifying the 
amendment.  The Fourteenth Amendment affirmed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 by 
granting citizenship to everyone born or naturalized in the country regardless of race.  If a 
state denied a group of citizens suffrage based on race, its representation in Congress 
would decrease proportionally with the number of those denied these rights.  The law 
also contained a clause excluding those who had "engaged in insurrection or rebellion" 
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against the government from obtaining a position in the Senate, House, as the Vice 
President, or as the President.  Although the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
inevitable by 1868, Southern Democrats realized that universal male suffrage, especially 
in states like Louisiana that contained large black populations, would lead to defeat at the 
polls.  The Opelousas Courier (Dem.) printed a response to the amendment, where "the 
gravest apprehensions are felt and expressed here by leading men of both parties as to the 
possible consequences of this usurpation on the part of Congress."53 
 By the summer of 1868, St. Landry Democrats were feeling a sense of 
hopelessness, given the legislative occurrences since the end of the war.  Economic 
hardships were widespread after crop failures in 1866 and 1867, the Democratic Party 
had experienced constant setbacks with federal legislation, attempts to control the labor 
force and return to the antebellum social hierarchy had largely failed, and their 
presidential ally was nearly impeached and had lost Congressional support.  Although a 
large amount of local positions had been won in St. Landry by Democrats in April, a 
Republican governor and the signing of the state constitution, which included universal 
male suffrage, were ominous.  Without a successful presidential election, hopes for the 
future were low.  Seemingly without other options to secure their candidate's victory, 
violence and intimidation became the means to a desirable end for regional Democrats. 
 During the summer of 1868, violence still appeared to be uncoordinated and 
random, although frequent.  In late June, night-riders shot at but missed a freedmen 
outside of Opelousas, a "nightly occurrence" in the area.  On July 7, masked men killed 
two freedmen, one child, and wounded two other freedmen.  In early July a freedman 
prisoner was "rescued" from the parish jail but was never heard from again.  Also in July, 
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a freedmen reported the fear of even leaving his house, as he discovered multiple armed 
men waiting concealed just feet from his door over the course of several nights.  
"Outrages" on freedmen such as these were common during the summer of 1868, where 
intimidation and violence was widespread throughout the South, but were particularly 
frequent in Louisiana.  Due to its relatively large size as a parish and its location outside 
of federal military reach, St. Landry Parish was among the most afflicted in terms of 
violence.  Republicans felt that without a military presence, "free speech will be 
dangerous (and) justice at law a mockery" in the parish.  Warmoth confirmed this feeling 
with an August letter to Washington asking for additional troops in order to prevent 
violence and corruption within the state, a request that was denied.54 
Newspapers in the South were often circulated to a far lesser extent than Northern 
papers, as literacy rates and funding opportunities were much lower in the region.  To 
secure funding, patronage was often required, resulting in fierce competition between 
local newspapers and often leaving some publications with short life spans.  Most of 
these papers were small and issued weekly.  After the end of the Civil War, Democratic 
papers in St. Landry Parish included the Southern Sentinel and the Opelousas Courier.  In 
April, 1866, the Republican Party formed in St. Landry Parish.  By July, 1867, the first 
Republican paper in the parish, the St. Landry Progress, came into existence, lasting until 
its means of production were destroyed during the massacre preceding the 1868 national 
election.55  The Progress was the official Republican paper of both St. Landry and 
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Lafayette parishes for its lifetime.  The formation of the St. Landry Progress led to 
increased competition for scarce patronage, forcing the Southern Sentinel to reform by 
late 1867 under new direction as the Opelousas Journal.  Both the Opelousas Journal 
and the Opelousas Courier would survive through the rest of Reconstruction, although 
gaps in publication were occasionally necessary to remain afloat.56 
 At the St. Landry Progress, Bentley constantly found himself at odds with the 
Democrats of the parish as an outspoken Radical Republican.  He frequently argued 
publicly with the editors at the Opelousas Courier, where the two papers were used as a 
forum.  Accounts given regarding occurrences at political meetings were common 
grounds for argument, where one paper would print an article slandering local leaders of 
the opposite faction and the ideals of their party, followed by the other paper's rebuttal.  
Topics of articles printed in the Progress, whose slogan was "Truth, Justice, Equality," 
also drew Democratic ire, as universal suffrage and equal rights were regularly supported.  
Tension grew throughout the summer for various reasons in St. Landry Parish, but all that 
was needed to break the peace was an article written by Bentley describing Democratic 
actions at a Republican meeting and procession.  
 In addition to being the Republican voice of St. Landry Parish, the Progress was 
also unique in its relations with freedmen in the region.  An attached clubhouse to the 
Progress office also served as a meeting hall for the local Republican Party, where 
weekly meetings were held on Sundays and usually contained 200-400 attendees.  The 
office also held Republican membership lists, which would be used by Democrats during 
the massacre to identify and find local party leaders.  Due to his interaction with the black 
community both as a schoolteacher and as the editor of the parish Republican paper, 
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Bentley quickly became a local Republican leader.  In this position, both in St. Landry 
and elsewhere during his lifetime, Bentley became the target of Democratic aggression 
and consequently became ostracized from multiple white communities.57 
 The Knights of the White Camelia (KWC), a secret society similar to the Ku 
Klux, first formed during the early summer of 1868 in St. Mary Parish under the auspices 
of Alcibiades DeBlanc, an attorney, and Daniel Dennett, the influential editor of the 
Franklin Planter's Banner.  The primary goals of the KWC were to preserve the "white 
man's government" and to protect the region "against the uprising of the blacks, if 
necessary."  From St. Mary, southeast of St. Landry on the Gulf of Mexico, the 
organization spread quickly throughout Louisiana with "nearly universal" white male 
membership in parishes won by Seymour in the November elections of 1868.58   
St. Landry Parish was no different, as Joel Sandez, the Democratic editor of the 
Opelousas Courier, estimated for KWC membership to be nearly 3,000 in a parish that 
contained 13,776 total whites, including women and children.  This seems to be a 
conservative estimate, as multiple others claimed for membership to be general, or nearly 
ubiquitous, among the whites.  John C. Tucker, a Republican, testified that he was 
"elected" into the club during the summer of 1868 by J. Saunders King, a prominent 
parish Democrat, without his knowledge.  Tucker felt the necessity to comply and join 
both the KWC and the Hancock Guards "in order to preserve my life."  Although the 
organizations were present and there was some intimidation during the summer of 1868, 
collective violence was not utilized until the fall.  The KWC, led by James M. Thompson 
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and R.A. Littell in St. Landry Parish, would be the central organizing force behind this 
fall violence.59 
 A primary Democratic complaint during the summer of 1868 was that 
Republicans were holding armed political meetings at night behind closed doors.  They 
feared that these white Radical "incendiaries," such as Emerson Bentley, would provoke 
the freedmen into riotous behavior.  One of the most common fears was that the freedmen 
would burn the town and slaughter the white inhabitants within.  However, Republican 
political meetings were generally held during the daytime in public, contrary to some 
Democratic rhetoric.  Due to planter complaints of freedmen missing work to attend 
meetings, Sundays were often chosen to prevent friction.  Although local Republican 
leaders mostly expressed a desire for attendees of these meetings to arrive unarmed, side 
arms were generally carried at a minimum.  But this was not uncommon, as the region 
remained relatively unsettled in 1868 and guns were often carried for everyday affairs.  
There were also incidents of harassment and violence towards freedmen on their way to 
Republican meetings, so many felt not only the necessity of protection from nature, but 
also from the local whites.  These incidents increased during the summer, with tension 
between the parties and the races rising as the presidential election neared.  To exacerbate 
Democratic irritation with regional Republicans, the St. Landry Progress was given the 
coveted parish printing contract in early September, 1868.60  
 Also in early September, Bentley found a note posted on the schoolhouse door 
that read "E.B. Beware! K.K.K." with a "dripping dagger, skull and bones, and coffin 
painted on."  By this time news of the Ku Klux had spread widely, and as there was no 
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known presence of the organization in St. Landry in 1868, its signature probably used to 
instill fear to a greater effect than any other organization's would.  Another recipient of 
this general threat was J.J. Beauchamp, the Republican chairman of the parish board of 
supervisors, who found two threatening letters signed by the Ku Klux at his home during 
the course of 1868.  To a question asking of his knowledge of the Ku Klux in the region, 
Beauchamp responded: "I do not know what the name of the organization is, but I am 
satisfied that there is a secret organization of some kind there."  Determined to stop the 
"incendiary" speeches of the Republicans, Democrats targeted Republican leaders at an 
increasing rate during the summer of 1868, and when September came the "war of the 
races" seemed to be imminent.61 
 During the late summer, various reports circulated of two shipments of arms 
arriving in St. Landry by boat from New Orleans for the purpose of arming the 
Democratic population.  Democrats denied knowledge of the shipments, but interrogators 
seemed to have known of their occurrence.  J.J. Beauchamp (Rep.) claimed to have seen 
his neighbor preparing cartridge boxes for several weeks before the commencement of 
the massacre on September 28.  The first shipment was said to contain fifty police pistols, 
or revolvers, and no knowledge was held on the contents of the second shipment.  After 
the massacre, area whites claimed for their actions to be in response to the impending 
threat of a black insurrection, but the fact that Democratic rhetoric constantly referred to 
the need for Republicans to gain protection by joining their ranks and due to the timely 
arrival of arms to the parish, premeditation is not out of the question.62 
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 On September 13, 1868, a Republican meeting was held in Washington, the 
secondary hub of St. Landry Parish, located about six miles north of Opelousas.  After 
this meeting, a procession organized and marched to Opelousas, where additional 
speeches were given.  The meeting featured two speakers, Sam Johnson, a black man, 
and Armstead Lewis, a black preacher.  As one of the handful of white Republicans in the 
area, Bentley was scheduled to speak as well, but he was advised against it by those close 
to him for his safety from the local Democrats.  The week before this meeting, Democrats 
claim to have heard "colored"63 speakers declare that they desired for black Democrats to 
return to the Republican party, "at the point of the bayonet" if need be.  Hearing of a large 
Republican gathering, upwards of 1,000 people, occurring near Washington on the 
morning of September 13, parish whites went to arms, believing that blacks intended to 
burn Washington and kill its inhabitants.  The resulting confrontation would begin the 
chain of events that led to the St. Landry Massacre.64 
 In response to the large black gathering, parish whites gravitated towards the 
towns of Opelousas and Washington in what they believed was a precautionary measure.  
When the Republican procession arrived in Washington, its members found Seymour 
Knights "drawn up in line" and in uniform on the street, later in front of the platform 
where speeches were given.  Parish Democrats were often members of multiple secret 
societies, and the Seymour Knights were another one of these groups.  The St. Landry 
organization was led by Solomon Loeb, a local businessman, and Ferreol Perrodin, the 
parish deputy sheriff who would become the mayor in early 1869, was second in 
command.  While the Democrats remained peaceful in action during this meeting, the 
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potential threat was high as individual speakers were threatened and reports of several 
hundred armed whites, hiding in the nearby woods prepared to take action, were 
circulated.65 
Even though the meeting ended peacefully, the armed Democratic presence was 
not welcome to the Republicans.  During the meeting, Loeb and Bentley were seen 
exchanging "harsh words" with one another.  As the Republican procession returned to 
Opelousas, L. Saunders King (Dem) and Edward T. Lewis (Dem.), a local lawyer who 
would later lead the St. Landry White League, stopped the Republicans to explain 
Democratic intentions for appearing at the meeting, which were preventative in nature.  
During the discussion, a gun was fired from one of the two Republican wagons into the 
air.  King immediately pulled a gun and leveled it at Bentley's head, but as the origin of 
the shot could not be discerned it was labeled as a misfire and the groups parted 
peacefully.66 
 The events around Washington on September 13 resulted in two measures taken 
by both parties in the parish prior to the massacre, a Democratic "interview" of Bentley 
and a peace treaty signed between the leading Republicans and Democrats of St. Landry.  
The interview occurred sometime during the next five days and consisted of local 
Democratic leaders telling Bentley what their intentions were on September 13 and how 
they should be represented in the Progress, or Bentley "would be held personally 
responsible for it."  The peace treaty, signed on September 19, focused on preventing the 
conflict between Republican and Democrat, black and white, that seemed to be just 
around the corner.  Although Republican and Democratic meetings were reportedly open 
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to all by this point, the peace treaty contained a clause that allowed for the inclusion of all 
parish citizens.  The groups agreed upon provisions that disallowed any form of 
"incendiary" comments, whether in newspapers or during speeches.  Firearms of any sort 
were not allowed from this point forward at any meeting or procession and alcohol was 
not to be served at the meetings or nearby their location on the day of.  The section about 
firearms was important, as Democrats often complained about the amount of arms taken 
by blacks to these meetings and this was a large point of dispute during the events at 
Washington the week before.  The results of the peace conference mostly reflected 
Democratic fears, where a drunken black uprising would burn their homes and kill their 
families.  However, due to apathetic local law enforcement and greater white armament, 
Republicans also benefited.67 
 The peace did not last long, as on the same day that the peace conference occurred 
Bentley's article on the meeting and procession appeared in the Progress.  Bentley later 
claimed that he was only attempting to represent the truth behind the events at 
Washington the week before, but Democrats felt that the article broke the terms of the 
peace.  In the article, Bentley wrote that "the assembly of armed men from all parts of the 
parish did not indicate peaceful intentions, but a total blindness to the interests of the 
people."  Bentley also wrote of the intimidation present towards certain speakers, where 
they were forced to refrain from speaking in fear of their lives.  Furthermore, Bentley 
directly attacked Democratic tactics, declaring that Republicans "do not plot in the dark; 
we do not assassinate inoffensive citizens or threaten to do so; we do not seek the lives of 
political opponents; we do not seek to array one class against another; but we intend to 
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defend our just rights at all hazards."  This article was the tinder that started the fire 
within the parish, left to consume its inhabitants less than ten days later.68 
 At around 10 a.m. on Monday, September 28, 1868, Democrats Sebastian Mayo, 
John Williams, and James R. Dickson called on Bentley at the schoolhouse when Bentley 
was teaching.  Mayo was a local constable, Williams was a stranger to the area, and 
Dickson was a lawyer at the time, later to become a district judge.  The three men, all 
Seymour Knights, approached Bentley, declared that he had broken the peace treaty with 
his article depicting the events at Washington on September 13, and demanded a 
retraction of that article.  Outgunned and outmanned, Bentley signed the retraction but 
the three men, led by Dickson, gave him a “severe caning” of around thirty blows, 
causing the children to flee the schoolhouse.   During their flight, Mayo was reported to 
have "pointed his pistol at them."  This violent outburst was but a prelude to the chaos 
that would encompass St. Landry Parish during the upcoming weeks.69   
 The children, upon escape of the schoolhouse, believed that Bentley was killed.  
Word spread quickly through the parish about the murder of a prominent member of the 
Radical Republican community.  But, unbeknownst to the children, Bentley was still 
alive.  After the attack, Emerson's brother, Linden, found him with a large group of black 
citizens heading to the office of the justice of the peace to file an affidavit.  After filing 
the affidavit, Bentley was told that there was fighting in Opelousas and if he returned his 
life would most likely be lost.  Injured and in danger, as the massacre commenced, 
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Bentley hid in a barn behind the Progress office until the next morning.  On the morning 
of September 29, Bentley left the barn in fear of a Democratic search and hid in some 
weeds until the next day.  By this time, Bentley had not eaten or drank anything for a 
period of thirty-three hours and decided to make his escape, where he was "chased by an 
armed body of white men" across a field and escaped with the aid of friends.  Bentley hid 
in gullies and various safehouses, including John Amrein's (Rep.) barn on the eighth 
night after the massacre, until he was able to board a skiff to Plaquemines, located east of 
St. Landry and southwest of Baton Rouge on the Mississippi.  These safehouses were 
usually owned by freedmen, hommes de couleur, or white Republicans who personally 
knew the traveler and were used for short-term protection.  The people who aided the 
fleeing Republicans were momentarily safe from the wrath of the locals, usually through 
swearing allegiance to the Democratic Party.  From Plaquemines, Bentley found a 
steamer and traveled to New Orleans in an escape that lasted three weeks.  While Bentley 
was able to escape, many Republicans and blacks in the parish were not as fortunate.70  
 As word spread regarding the apparent murder of Bentley on the morning of 
September 28, local Democratic leaders sprung into action to prevent Republican 
organization from occurring.  The primary men in charge were the head of the local 
Seymour Knights chapter, Solomon Loeb, and the two leaders of the St. Landry KWC, 
James M. Thompson and R.A. Littell.  Acting immediately after Bentley's caning, L. 
Saunders King received "an order from (mayor Felix King) to stop all armed bodies 
coming into the town of Opelousas."  Large groups of Democrats mounted their horses, 
armed themselves, and searched the region for any signs of organization, as their 
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longtime fear of a black insurrection found itself manifested in reports that "a large body 
of whites had been killed, and that nothing would stop it but extermination."  Armed men 
went from house to house, searching for black people and either arrested them or worse.71   
Some black men attempted to prevent the impending violence in the first stages of 
the massacre, such as John Simms, a homme de couleur, who collaborated with the 
Democrats by sending a group of black men back home who were on their way to 
Opelousas.  The first report of black coordination came from "General" Thomas 
Anderson's plantation, but Simms was able to send the estimated 30-40 men away by 
convincing them that Bentley was alive and that there was no need to come to his aid.  
However, in the only other instance of black organization during the massacre, the black 
men did not turn back.72 
 At around 3 p.m., reports circulated that a group had organized at Halaire Paillet's 
plantation, one mile south of Opelousas.  L. Saunders King (Dem.) was once again a 
member of the first group to arrive, which Democrats claim to have been no larger than 
eight people, where he found a group of around two dozen armed black men.  Upon 
ordering the black men to lay down their arms and to come peacefully with him to 
Opelousas, the black leader refused and gave the order to open fire.  The short skirmish 
resulted in one black death, a fatal gunshot wound to King's horse, and several injuries on 
both sides, including Thomas Anderson's cousin, Baylis, and a Captain Mayo.73  The 
white group captured eight black combatants and took them to the courthouse in 
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Opelousas, later brought to the local jail, while the remainder of the survivors fled into 
the surrounding woods and fields.74  
 After the skirmish at the Pailett plantation, "no armed negro organization was 
found" in the parish for the remainder of the massacre.  Yet the white population 
continued to gather in Opelousas, increasing to between 2,000-2,500 by nightfall, a 
number maintained the following morning.  By September 29, a Washington citizen 
found a scene of general black abandonment of their homes: the inhabitants either taken 
away or had fled the area.  Understandably, no blacks who had not already sworn 
allegiance to the Democratic Party could be found in Opelousas, and while shots were 
heard occasionally, no murders within the corporation were reported.  Patrols roamed the 
region for around two weeks with the purpose of "disarming" the blacks and Democratic 
leaders posted sentinels around Opelousas and Washington in order to prevent black 
citizens from entering or leaving.  While it is entirely possible that the black organization 
had been crippled beyond repair on the first day, the more plausible scenario was that 
there was no plan in place to burn Opelousas and kill its white inhabitants.  The largest 
group of black men reported found was at the Pailett plantation, and they were no threat 
to overtake the immense white presence in Opelousas.  In fact, one Confederate veteran 
agreed that the "negroes were entirely at their mercy" by the second day, victims of an 
"uncontrollable excitement" that gripped the white population.  But this white population 
showed no mercy, as the scattered killings across the parish on the second day were 
reported to represent the highest body count during the massacre.75 
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 Throughout September 28 and the early part of September 29, black citizens had 
been rounded up and sent to the prison in Opelousas, estimated to be twenty-nine in total.  
Two of these men were Joseph Gradney and his brother, who had heard about the 
troubles on September 28 and proceeded unarmed to Opelousas from nearby Washington 
to check on the status of their family.  On their way, the brothers encountered a white 
patrol, who brought them to Opelousas.  The leader of the patrol was heard speaking to 
"Colonel" Thompson, and was ordered to "kill anything that was captured" instead of 
taking additional prisoners.  The prisoners remained in the jail overnight, but they would 
not stay there long.  At around 4 p.m. on September 29, Loeb was overheard talking to 
the jailer in order to acquire the jailhouse key at a certain time.  That night, sometime 
after 10 p.m., a crowd "broke into" the jail, removed the prisoners from their cells, and 
took them to an undisclosed location outside of the prison that held over thirty armed 
Democrats led by Loeb.  Fortunately, the Gradney brothers were separated from the rest 
of the prisoners by Ferreol Perrodin (Dem.), the deputy sheriff.  Perrodin denied that he 
helped the Gradney brothers, but they cited a personal acquaintance with the lawman as 
the reason for his aid.  The rest of the prisoners were taken a short distance into the 
woods in small groups to be shot.  The bodies were left where they fell for several days 
until they were buried haphazardly, "with portions of the body out of ground...upon 
which the buzzards were feeding."76 
 At around 10 p.m. on September 29, around the same time that the prisoners were 
executed, materials used for and the press of the St. Landry Progress were taken into the 
street and either destroyed or set ablaze.  The benches for the schoolhouse where Bentley 
taught were also "torn to pieces, and the school (was) broken up."  The Progress was the 
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voice of the St. Landry Republican party, and while its destruction crippled the party in 
St. Landry, it was not the only paper to have been destroyed during this time period.  By 
May, 1869, those involved directly with newspapers in Louisiana believed there to be no 
Republican paper within 100 miles of the parish, the nearest being in Nacogdoches, 
located to the northwest of St. Landry in Natchitoches Parish.  Unsurprisingly, 
Natchitoches was one of the two parishes not located on the Mississippi River to vote for 
the Republican candidate in November, suggesting a relative lack of violence and voter 
intimidation.  As violence dismantled the regional Republican party, its members 
survived either by fleeing the area or by converting to the Democratic party.77 
 Presumably, before the Gradney brothers were released, they received some form 
of protection from the Democratic wrath.  After September 28, no black person could 
travel into Opelousas without a red ribbon tied around their arm, a symbol of Democratic 
conversion and safety from violence.  Protection papers were also passed out in the 
weeks after the massacre and blacks felt compelled to file these for their own safety.  
Their signatures on these papers declared for them to be members of a Democratic club, 
and were thusly "entitled to the friendship, confidence, and protection of all good 
Democrats."  There were no political meetings after September 28, Republican or 
Democrat.  There was no need, with the regional Republican presence eradicated and the 
November vote secured for the Democrats.  Beverly Wilson, a blacksmith in Opelousas 
and an influential black Republican, believed that by the end of 1868, black citizens were 
"in a worse condition now than in slavery."  Republican inhabitants of the region felt a 
sense of hopelessness, as even exhibiting Republican ideas was enough to endanger their 
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lives, and those that did not flee or were killed found themselves with no option other 
than to convert to the Democratic party.78 
 The St. Landry Massacre was a general uprising that lasted around two weeks, 
and most able-bodied white Democrats were involved in one way or another.  Actions 
taken by white Democrats during this time were supported by local civil authorities, who 
"refused to execute" any affidavits against those who had committed the atrocities.  After 
caning Bentley, Dickson was arrested for the attack but had escaped the same day, the 
matter not to be revisited.  During this time, especially during the first several days of the 
massacre, Republican leaders were hunted.  One such leader was C.E. Durand, the French 
editor of the Progress.  As a representative of the "incendiary" speakers that regional 
Democrats grew to despise, Durand was to be made an example of.  The editor was not 
seen after the night of September 28, and although the exact date that he was murdered is 
unclear, Durand was killed sometime within the first three days of the massacre.  By the 
third day, Durand's corpse was put on display outside of the Opelousas drug store as a 
warning to other "incendiaries."  The drug store was owned by Claudius Mayo, an 
influential Democrat and Sebastian Mayo's brother, in a partnership with James 
Thompson (Dem.).  Durand's murder and the attempts on other white Republicans are 
significant, as they help dispel Democratic claims as to the reasons behind the 
massacre.79 
 Democratic testimony usually described the events as a personal conflict that 
escalated into a race war, and their reaction of mass murder was one based out of fear of 
a black uprising that would compromise the life of every white person in the area.  One 
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historian described the white response as conditioned, a result of constant warnings 
against black insurrections by the Democratic community.  The Democratic leaders were 
able to use this conditioning, as newspaper articles and rhetoric were increasingly 
targeted towards the possibility of a black insurrection since the passage of the 
Reconstruction Acts, in order to eliminate the Republican presence in the parish and 
establish Democratic control.  At one point, Loeb was heard saying that the Democratic 
plan was to "kill every man who has been engaged in deceiving the freedmen and trying 
to create enmity between the races.”  The idea of this being purely a race riot is false, as 
white Republican leaders were also targeted and blamed for giving the black population 
illusions of progress.  During the massacre, Southern conservatives expressed fears that 
blacks "were going to ride in Mrs. So-and-So's carriage, and to sit at Mrs. So-and-So's 
table" in attempts to stir up the white masses.  But these were just tools to incite the local 
white population, as actions of local Democratic leaders during and after the massacre 
suggest political ambitions, and not one of defense and protection from a black 
insurrection.  The elimination of these Republican leaders would allow for the Democrats 
to control, through violence and intimidation, the black vote that would decide the 
November election in St. Landry.80 
 Most Republican leaders in St. Landry were able to escape, but not without 
difficulty.  The Donato brothers, hommes de couleur, and Sam Johnson, a freedman, were 
both able to leave the area, but no record survives of their escape.  At around 8:30 p.m. 
on the night of September 28, while hiding in the barn behind the Progress office, 
Emerson Bentley overheard Solomon Loeb say "Come on boys; Let's go get Francois 
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D'Avy."  During the course of the day, D'Avy had conversed with multiple other 
prominent Republicans to decide a course of action, including Linden Bentley and 
Gustave Donato.   These Republican leaders decided that D'Avy would write a telegram 
to the governor describing the events while the others sent couriers to warn the black 
inhabitants of the parish.  By nightfall, D'Avy felt as if the excitement had died down and 
that he was not in danger.  But, sometime between 10 p.m. and 11 p.m., a group of men 
came into his house and pulled him into the street.  While on the street, the group taunted 
D'Avy, struck him with the butt of a gun, dislocating his shoulder, and shot him, grazing 
the side of his face.  D'Avy escaped by feigning death, but a picket stopped him on his 
way out of the area.  He managed to escape, but not without a dislocated ankle.  Moving 
between safehouses and recovering from multiple injuries, it took D'Avy eighty days to 
arrive in New Orleans.81 
 John Amrein, the Republican parish judge, was ill with yellow fever during the 
second half of 1868.  One of Amrein's sons died on September 28 of causes unrelated to 
the massacre, but armed Democratic guards did not allow him entrance into town for 
burial in order to limit Republican communication, so Amrein buried his child in the yard 
at his plantation on the morning of September 30.  During the weeks after the riot, 
Amrein received multiple visits from regional Democrats, the first coming just hours 
after he buried his child.  Here, a group of over a dozen men approached Amrein, 
claiming an intent to "disarm the radical party."  But, the conversation quickly 
degenerated into insults directed at Amrein, and at one point the Democrats blamed the 
massacre directly on him and other Republican speakers, having "advised these colored 
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men to make all this fuss and riot."  At this, the party of armed men left Amrein and his 
sick family safe for the moment.82 
 About three weeks after the riot began, Amrein began to receive additional 
Democratic callers at night, led by J. Saunders King.  King promised Amrein's safety 
through the door, then proceeded to question the Republican at gunpoint about the 
Knights of the Grand Republic, an organization designed to aid widows and orphans of 
the Civil War and to support reconstruction measures.  Amrein promised the men a copy 
of the organization's constitution, which he provided for them the following day.  Before 
leaving, the men told Amrein that he should remain at home, as night patrols were a 
danger to him.  Two nights after Amrein provided the constitution, groups of men 
appeared at his house and surrounded it, making their presence known but not taking 
action.  This continued for three nights.  On the fourth day, Amrein traveled to Opelousas 
but was too sick to continue at one point and was forced to stay in a safehouse for several 
days.  As the parish judge, Amrein felt relatively safe from violence, but upon hearing 
warnings about his safety and of an order of banishment from the parish from friends in 
Opelousas, he decided to contact James M. Thompson (Dem.), a local KWC head.  
Thompson confirmed his banishment, explaining that Amrein's “politics do not suit the 
people.”  Amrein was forced to sell his plantation, but as he was still stricken with yellow 
fever throughout this entire ordeal, he remained in the parish until he recovered in early 
January, 1869, when he left for New Orleans.83 
 As the violence had largely subsided by the end of October, Swan Miller and J. 
Baptiste Antoine falsely believed that they were safe to return to St. Landry and distribute 
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Republican tickets.  Miller was a Swedish immigrant that favored Republican politics and 
Antoine was a local Republican.  Miller was not present during the September and 
October violence, having left St. Landry in July of that year due to "animosities exhibited 
against (his) politics."  Antoine had a close encounter during the massacre, where he was 
taken into the woods with a freedman named Tony.  Tony was shot, but Antoine was able 
to escape by swearing Democratic allegiance.  Upon arrival in the town, the men were 
denied accommodation at a local hotel and were confronted by a group of Democrats.  
The group questioned their political affiliation, but the Republicans were able to pass 
without trouble as Antoine carried a Seymour and Blair badge for such an occasion.  
Later that day, Antoine was taken to the prison, but not before discarding the Republican 
tickets he carried.  The white locals in charge appear to have not known Antoine's 
political affiliation with certainty, as once again they let him go free with a mere promise 
of giving a Democratic speech that night.  Antoine was able to escape the parish under 
the cover of darkness, but Miller, seen being taken away as Antoine was escorted to jail, 
was not as fortunate.84 
 After being denied accommodation at the hotel, Miller went to the Freedmen's 
Bureau office, where he encountered ex-agent Oscar Violet and conversed with him 
outside of the office.  Violet blamed Miller for his removal from the Bureau post, as 
Miller reported Violet earlier that year for ordering a black man off a plantation, treating 
him "roughly and unmannerly" in the process.  Violet, known to be of Democratic 
tendencies, often placed planter's ambitions over those of the black laborers.  Upon their 
return to the office, Miller found an estimated 30-50 armed men waiting for him, who 
gave him ten minutes to leave Opelousas lest he wished a violent removal.  The armed 
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group relieved Miller of his Republican tickets then Ferreol Perrodin and a Bureau agent 
escorted him out of town.  Although Perrodin sided with the Democrats throughout the 
canvass, this was the second noted occasion that he went out of his way to prevent 
additional violence.  These men left Miller after he had made it around two miles outside 
of Opelousas, but "a good many" men were following the group, including individuals 
who had threatened Miller previously.  Perrodin and the Bureau Agent were relieved by 
another deputy sheriff, C.C. Dasson, who unsuccessfully ordered the trailing men to 
return to their homes.  Miller and Dasson made it to the woods by dusk, where the deputy 
sheriff left Miller to his own devices.  Dasson made it no more than fifty yards away from 
Miller when the attackers rode in at full gallop, pistols drawn.  Dasson fired at one of the 
men and missed, but this gave Miller enough time to escape into the woods, where he hid 
that night.  During the course of the night and the following day, the group continued to 
search for Miller, who eventually escaped with the aid of a black man.  More than a 
month after Bentley's caning and mere days before the election of November 3, 
"terrorism still exist(ed)" in St. Landry.85 
 Accurate death tolls are difficult to discern for most Reconstruction violence, 
including the events in St. Landry.  White evasiveness and solidarity in testimonies 
usually only provided minor details or general information already known to 
investigators.  The black population was usually so scared of white retribution that they 
remained silent if they wished to remain in the area.  The St. Landry Massacre also 
featured many different groups of whites riding around the parish committing "outrages" 
against blacks and white Republicans, and if the state Democratic leaders knew of the 
number killed in total, they did not let it be known.  Jesse M. Lee, a lieutenant for the 
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United States army, was sent to Louisiana on September 18, 1868 to investigate turmoil 
in various regions in the state.  When Lee arrived in St. Landry on October 3, he found an 
intimidated black population alongside an uncooperative white population, and felt that 
no information would be available unless there was a military presence.  Lee found that 
in "most parts of the State a systematic series of outrages, robberies, and murders were 
committed on the loyal people with the avowed intention of intimidating, and thus 
forcing, them to abstain from voting, and of driving" the Republican leaders out of the 
area.86 
 Lee's report estimated that 223 total deaths occurred in St. Landry Parish during 
the massacre, but white solidarity and black fear forced him to rely on the Democratic 
press for some of these numbers, as with "the state of lawlessness and intimidation 
existing it has been impossible to procure full evidence from this parish."  General 
Hatch's report for the Freedmen's Bureau encountered similar difficulties in obtaining 
information and only reported 23 deaths, the number that most Democratic testimony 
seemed to have agreed upon.  The Board of Registrars for St. Landry Parish estimated for 
over 200 total deaths.  Democratic testimonies fell between 23-75 total deaths while 
Republican estimates ranged between 200-500.  However, the dates in which the 
Republican estimates fell varied, as violence was common enough to begin including 
deaths as early as March, 1868.  As no Republican newspapers were in existence in the 
area at this time, Democratic papers are the only sources available that provided numbers.  
The far-right Franklin Planter's Banner, edited by the same Daniel Dennett who had 
helped form the KWC in Louisiana, estimated that 100 black deaths had occurred, a 
number that regional Democratic papers appear to have agreed upon.  During this time 
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period, Lee's report confirmed only two white deaths, one Republican and one Democrat, 
and the highest estimate of white Democratic casualties was four.  No estimates were 
given as to white Republican deaths, but John Amrein (Rep.) testified to a House 
committee that investigated occurrences during the 1868 presidential canvass that "every 
leader of the republican party whom I knew of, who did not escape, has been killed."  
Judging by the general state of lawlessness in the region and the vigor in which the 
Democrats hunted Republicans, 250 black deaths is by no means an impossibility, and 
the total number of deaths probably fell between 200-250 from September 28 until 
November 3.  Large numbers of Republicans also fled the region, and although actual 
numbers are not known with certainty, Emerson Bentley estimated for the total to be near 
200.  The massacre was a Democratic success, and Dennett stated that the Democrats 
were "well satisfied with the result."87 
 The presidential election on November 3, 1868, was by no means fair.  The 
Republican population of St. Landry parish and of Louisiana as a whole was intimidated 
into submission.  Republicans who had remained in the parish were compelled to join 
Democratic clubs to ensure safety.  When they arrived at the polls, armed guards 
distributed Democratic tickets to the voters and made sure that the tickets were placed in 
Seymour's box.  The supervisors of registration for St. Landry were "fully convinced that 
no man on that day could have voted any other than the democratic ticket and not been 
killed inside of twenty-four hours thereafter."  In an election where Seymour received 
39,557 votes to Grant's 25,233 in Louisiana, St. Landry Parish was one of seven in the 
state that did not record a single Republican vote.  In fact, Grant majorities were all 
found, with the exceptions of Rapides and Natchitoches parishes, in parishes on the 
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Mississippi River, where federal control was more secure.  While Grant won the 
nomination, Seymour's victory in Louisiana was carried by violence.88 
 Fair voting practices in the presidential election were not the only casualties of the 
fall violence.  Congressional elections on November 3 were also fraudulent and often 
very lopsided due to a nonexistent Republican voter turnout and corruption at the polls.  
The election in the Third Congressional District of Louisiana between C.B. Darrall (Rep) 
and Adolphe Bailey (Dem) is another example of violence impacting poll results.  As in 
the presidential elections, Darrall did not receive a single vote in any of the district 
parishes other than St. Mary.  Citing fraudulence and intimidation, Darrall contested 
Bailey's seat by early December, 1868.  By this point, returns from St. Martin Parish had 
already been thrown out due to "a want of legal returns," or fraud.  Republican testimony 
unanimously stated a desire to vote for Darrall, but the overarching fear of white 
retaliation towards Republican action prevented most from voting the Republican ticket 
after the massacres of September and October.  Fraud most likely reduced total 
Republican votes to zero.89   
April Gubernatorial Returns90    November Congressional Returns 
Parish Candidates     Candidates 
 Warmoth Taliaferro Baker Voorhies  Darrall Bailey 
Lafayette 743 121 137 0  0 1,420 
St. Landry 2,514 649 1,187 0  0 4,683 
St. Martin 1,057 915 530 0    
St. Mary 2,019 811 3 0  1,132 1,814 
Vermillion 133 39 70 0  0 957 
 
 By February, 1869, Bentley left New Orleans for a position as assistant editor of 
the St. Bernard Herald.  But, shortly after Bentley began work, John Tucker (Rep.), the 
                                                 
88
 Supplemental Report, xxix; Darrall v. Bailey, 5-6, 21-22; Tunnell, 158. 
89
 Darrall v. Bailey. 
90
 Ibid., 23-24. 
  
64 
Assistant Assessor of Internal Revenue in Opelousas, proposed a partnership in starting a 
new Republican paper in St. Landry Parish.  Tucker felt that anti-Republicanism in the 
parish had waned since the massacre, to the point where it was safe for their return.  
However, Tucker was mistaken, as the parish remained hostile to Republicans of any race 
throughout Reconstruction and eventually became the home to the first of Louisiana's 
White League in 1874.  Democrats had something to gain by preventing the 
establishment of the paper, as Warmoth promised Bentley and Tucker the state printing 
contract.  If their paper was unsuccessful, Senator Thomas C. Anderson (Dem.) arranged 
for the contract to go to the Opelousas Journal, a relatively moderate paper under the 
influence of the Democratic parish leaders.  By early May, the U.S. Army 25th Colored 
Infantry Regiment arrived in Opelousas, sent to the area to ensure peace in the aftermath 
of the deadliest uprising in the Reconstruction Era.  As he was not fully convinced that 
the white population would not harm him, Bentley stayed with the black soldiers in their 
camp on the outskirts of Opelousas for protection.91 
 Similar to Lieutenant Jesse M. Lee's report on conditions immediately after the 
massacre, upon its arrival the black regiment found a deceptive peace, where Captain 
Frank M. Coxe reported that "although everything indicates quiet and order, it is not 
difficult to discern a temper...which uncontrolled would jeopardize the life of any 
Republican in his public expression of opinion."  The Democratic white community was 
virtually silent as to the events of the previous fall, but tension rose as the military 
presence lingered.  Threats were made on Bentley's life and eventually, some locals 
threatened to attack the camp if Bentley was not released into their control.  On May 11, 
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1869, Coxe reported that 50-100 "regulators" were in the wooded area nearby ready to 
make such an attack, although action was never taken.  Even with the military presence, 
multiple incidents of violence with racial and political overtones occurred within the 
Opelousas city limits.92 
 The first reported case of violence was against John Tucker (Rep.), Bentley's 
partner, on May 23, 1869.  Tucker left the confines of the army's camp at around 10 p.m. 
and 4-5 men followed him into Opelousas.  Here, these men attacked Tucker with the 
"purpose of assassination," resulting in two gunshot wounds and a blow to the head.  One 
of the shots grazed his arm and the other went through the arm, fracturing a bone in the 
process.  Tucker survived this attack, and with the aid of Coxe, attempted to find the 
offenders and turn them over to local authorities.  Upon investigation, Coxe found an 
uncooperative population who showed "no general desire that the perpetrators be found."  
Parish officials, such as Judge Garrigues (Dem.), were sympathetic to Tucker's attackers 
and were generally unwilling to aid Coxe in his investigation.  The day after the 
assassination attempt, a pamphlet circulated that declared for Tucker to have been drunk 
upon leaving the army camp, accidentally shooting himself.  Tucker testified that he was 
sober at the time of departure and Coxe confirmed, writing that the pamphlet was most 
likely "fabricated for the purpose of self-exoneration."93   
 Eventually, Tucker received a subpoena to testify before the Congressional 
Committee on Elections, but he was told "that he should not live to testify against this 
community."  Tucker's case was similar to many others across the South during 
Reconstruction, where civil authorities were unwilling or unable to prosecute criminals 
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for crimes against blacks or white Republicans.  Coxe's letters to his superior illustrate a 
frustration with the local government, expressing that "this occurrence, previous ones of 
like nature, (were) liable at any time to be repeated due to the utter inefficiency of the 
civic government."  He estimated that hundreds of "outrages" against white Republicans 
and freedmen since the war's end had occurred, yet no investigations had taken place 
even though the guilty parties were often known to local officials.  In fact, Coxe believed 
that securing an effective local government required a military presence, with a large 
number of soldiers ready to be called into the area.  These locals resented anything 
Republican, and despised the military presence to the point where the black soldiers were 
not safe from being targeted.94 
 Little more than a month later, in late June, another incident occurred in 
Opelousas.  An elderly owner of a saloon in town, John Cochran (Dem.), refused service 
to one of the black soldiers who stopped in for a drink on his way to a dance at the local 
dance hall.  Upon leaving the saloon and rejoining several other soldiers, the black soldier 
was followed and accosted by a half dozen men, one of whom was Captain May, a 
participant in the massacre nine months prior.  One black soldier was struck with a club 
wielded by Cochran then Captain May drew a pistol and told the soldiers that "no 
damned United States uniform can protect you here; we are going to clean you all out in a 
few days."  The soldiers were unarmed at the time, but were able to escape without 
serious injury.  Following the confrontation, with the local authorities not taking action, 
Captain Coxe filed an affidavit.  The case eventually wound up in the district court, but 
justice was not found.  During the trial process, Coxe showed continued exasperation 
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with the regional legal system, describing the juries as those "pledged to save from 
punishment their own Confederates."95 
 By May, 1869, although many local whites described the parish as being peaceful 
and law-abiding, Coxe found that "a formidable reign of terror has subdued the spirit of 
the people...I have never seen in my continuous experience in reconstruction duty, a class 
of people...so completely crushed as among the loyalists here."  In the 1870 census, St. 
Landry Parish contained 13,776 whites and 11,694 free blacks.  As a general rule, the 
white population voted Democratic while the black population voted Republican during 
Reconstruction, so the facts that Grant received no votes in November and that 
Democrats held a stranglehold on parish politics speaks volumes of the local impact of 
the St. Landry Massacre. 96    
 As the largest incident of violence during Reconstruction, the St. Landry 
Massacre accomplished its purpose of electing a Democratic president on the local level.  
Republicans in the parish were intimidated into submission, exiled, or killed.  After the 
massacre, Democrats secured control of St. Landry and the parish Republican Party was 
unable to recover for the remainder of Reconstruction.  As a response to the electoral 
bulldozing by violence and fraud found in 1868, preventative state and national 
legislation came into existence over the next several years.  However, this legislation's 
effectiveness was short-lived, as Southern conservatives began to gain influence while 
Radicalism waned nationally.  As Southern governments were beginning to be 
"redeemed" back into Democratic hands, Southern conservatives were able to use their 
successes in 1868 as blueprints for regional control.  After 1868, violence as a means of 
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control was utilized by Southern conservatives when other methods failed, plaguing the 
South for decades. 
 . 
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Chapter III 
To Maintain the White Man's Government 
  
 While the St. Landry Massacre succeeded in its initial goal of electing a 
Democratic president, at least on the local level, it impacted parish politics and power 
structures in the long-run as well.  Thomas C. Anderson, a Democratic state senator, was 
able to secure a power base in the parish after the massacre and controlled parish politics 
and patronage for the rest of Reconstruction.  As violence by secret societies permeated 
the South in late 1868, preventative measures were taken on state and national levels to 
prevent similar occurrences.  In Louisiana, one of these measures created the Returning 
Board on Elections, a committee that could discard any votes it deemed to be fraudulent, 
ultimately playing a role in deciding the outcome of elections in the state for the 
remainder of Reconstruction.  Nationally, the Fifteenth Amendment and the First 
Enforcement Act passed as attempts to secure and federally enforce rights granted to the 
freedmen in the Fourteenth Amendment and at the polls.  As a result of this legislation 
and further legislation that increased federal enforcement powers, violence and 
intimidation as they occurred in 1868 were no longer possible.  However, after the 
massacre, no Republican organization was found in St. Landry until 1872 and no parish 
Republican paper was produced until 1876.  In 1874, St. Landry became the host of the 
first Louisiana White League, a paramilitary organization that focused on the 
"redemption" of political control from Republican to Democratic hands.  But, its presence 
was unnecessary in the parish, as St. Landry's redemption occurred in 1868. 
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 St. Landry Parish was not the only area to experience collective violence in the 
South during the 1868 presidential campaign.  Local leaders often sanctioned these acts, 
as Lee, the federal investigator sent to the region after the massacres, found the violence 
not to be "the work of rowdies and roughs; their influential movers and backers were men 
called respectable and influential."  Bossier, Caddo, Jefferson, Orleans, St. Bernard, and 
St. Landry parishes all reported large scale collective violence, but increased violence 
was a regional phenomenon across the South and was not isolated in Louisiana.  Second 
only to Louisiana, Georgia also experienced violence on a broad scale, the largest 
outbreak being the Camilla Riot.  Camilla, the county seat of Mitchell County, was 
located in southwest Georgia.  As local Republicans were gathering for a meeting in 
Camilla on the morning of September 19, white locals fired on them and killed nearly a 
dozen.  Democrats in Camilla expressed the same fears present in St. Landry, where they 
felt that if the black population assembled inside of the corporation, an uprising would 
occur and white lives would be in danger.  While the number of black deaths was much 
lower than that experienced in Louisiana, its effect on the black population was similar.  
In the November presidential election, only two Republican votes were tallied in Mitchell 
County and Georgia became the only Southern state other than Louisiana and Tennessee 
to realize a Seymour victory.97 
 Large scale violence and intimidation occurred throughout Louisiana during the 
late summer months of 1868 and its effectiveness was far greater than previous 
Democratic attempts to restore the antebellum racial hierarchy.  Where labor fraud, 
legislation, and economic intimidation had failed, large scale collective violence provided 
                                                 
97
 New York Times, 10/10/1868; Supplemental Report, vi: Lee W. Formwalt, "The Camilla Massacre of 
1868: Racial Violence as Political Propaganda," Georgia Historical Quarterly LXXI (Fall, 1987), 399-426. 
  
71 
Horatio Seymour (Dem.) a victory in Louisiana in the November presidential election.  
Only two country parishes away from the Mississippi River and federal military reach 
voted for Ulysses S. Grant (Rep.) in November, both of which reported little to no voter 
intimidation during the presidential canvass.  Several parishes within federal military 
reach, surrounding New Orleans and on the Mississippi, experienced collective violence 
as well; even in areas where federal military control was found they could not adequately 
suppress the general white uprisings that occurred in the region.  This violence 
established long term Democratic dominance in several Louisiana parishes and created a 
blueprint for political control for the remainder of Reconstruction. 
 Most collective violence in Louisiana during the presidential canvas began in late 
September and lasted through the early November election.  Yet, the effects of these 
massacres were long term and played a role in the Democratic dominance that would 
envelop the state in 1874.  Bossier and Caddo parishes, located in the northwest corner of 
Louisiana bordering Texas, experienced consistent violence throughout the 
Reconstruction Era.  One historian even argued that Caddo Parish experienced the most 
violence in Louisiana during the period, in terms of deaths.  A U.S. Marshal in 
Shreveport described the area as a "desperate part of the country" and a "great place for 
drinking, gambling, and shooting."  Heavily concentrating in cotton production using 
sharecropping, Caddo Parish contained a black population of 15,799 and a white 
population of 5,913 in 1870.  However effective, in 1868, levels of violence in Caddo 
Parish did not reach the levels of other areas of the state, including Bossier Parish.  White 
perpetrators were often found to have crossed parish lines during incidents of collective 
violence and this was reported in both the Caddo and Bossier incidents.  The fact that 
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both parish seats, Shreveport in Caddo and Benton in Bossier, were within twenty miles 
of each other allowed for these perpetrators to travel with ease between the two parishes.  
The violence in Bossier Parish was even closer, occurring less than ten miles from 
Shreveport.  While the Ku Klux was not noted as far south as St. Landry Parish, 
testimonies reveal its presence in these two parishes and not that of the KWC, but as their 
methods and intents were similar, differences between the two are negligible.98 
 The primary incident in Caddo Parish occurred on October 12, 1868, when local 
whites took five black men from the local brickyard to the river and shot them.  This was 
a regular occurrence in the parish, as one witness estimated for 25-30 bodies to have 
floated down the river from the summer of 1868 until the November election.  On 
October 14, Robert Gray, a Republican Justice of the Peace elected in April but never 
allowed to occupy that position by local Democratic leaders, was shot and killed.  Just as 
in St. Landry, local Democrats confiscated Republican tickets, prominent Republicans 
found themselves in danger if they remained in the area, armed men surrounded the polls 
on election day, and Republicans only tallied one vote in November.  This Republican 
vote was cast by James Watson, who was killed that night.  Lee's report estimated for 
forty-three black deaths in Caddo Parish during this time period.  In December, 
Democrats held such a stranglehold on the parish that two local whites sentenced for life 
in prison were "rescued by an armed crowd," once again illustrating the inadequacies of 
law enforcement in rural Louisiana parishes.  While violence in Caddo Parish was 
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effective, only the massacre in St. Landry eclipsed the death toll in Bossier Parish during 
the 1868 presidential canvass.99 
 Just as in Caddo Parish, Bossier Parish relied heavily on cotton production and 
held a population that contained 9,170 black people and 3,505 whites.  Outrages in 
Bossier began on September 27, 1868, when a stranger from Arkansas named Gibson 
arrived at the Shady Grove Plantation and argued with freedmen there.  This 
confrontation resulted in the stranger firing a shot at an old black man, labeled as a 
Radical, which missed him.  The freedmen then restrained Gibson and chained him to a 
tree, hoping to turn the prisoner over to local law enforcement.  The next morning, 
Gibson was retrieved by a group of white men who claimed a desire to take him to the 
civil authorities in Bellevue, the closest town.  The freedmen obliged, having little hope 
of successful prosecution but glad to be rid of the man.  After this incident, word spread 
among the white population about a black uprising, whose members reportedly "yelled 
and whooped like a set of infuriated demons as they gloated over the prospect of spilling 
the white man's blood."  Shortly after white lawmen retrieved Gibson from the freedmen, 
a white mob of over forty men arrived at Shady Grove and began an "indiscriminate 
slaughter of the colored people."100  
 Although most black citizens in Bossier Parish eventually fled to the surrounding 
countryside, the parish was unique in terms of 1868 Louisiana violence where a black 
group mounted an opposition after the initial hostilities.  After the violence at Shady 
Grove, a group of around twenty-five black men traveled to the nearby Baer Plantation, 
where they arrested two of the men involved in the killings.  Although their claimed 
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intention was to bring the two men to Shreveport for trial, the whites were shot along the 
way.  The murders of the two white men sent the local population into a frenzy and bands 
of Democrats proceeded to patrol the countryside, claiming disarmament as a goal but in 
reality slaughtering large quantities of black citizens.  The U.S. Marshal, sent from 
nearby Shreveport on September 30, did not see any living freedmen aside from servants 
during his journey to the area, only finding corpses on the side of the road.  The violence 
continued at this pace throughout the first week of October, but began to simmer after 
that.  However, those expressing Republican sentiments were not welcome in the parish 
and were threatened with death should they stay as Republicans.  Lee's report estimated 
for 167 total deaths during this short but effective time period, where only one 
Republican vote was cast in the presidential election.101 
  Although violence was comparatively less common in sugar parishes and along 
the Mississippi River when compared to country parishes, these parishes were by no 
means isolated from uprisings.  As Warmoth's earlier request for federal military aid 
yielded no results and at this time it was illegal to form a militia, the state of Louisiana 
approved an act on September 13 that established a Metropolitan Police force which held 
jurisdiction in New Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard parishes.  This police force was 
under the direction of a board of five supervisors appointed by the governor, removing 
controlling power from civic authorities that proved unwilling or unable to prosecute 
offenders in racial injustices.  Intact until 1877 but significantly weakened after their 
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1874 defeat in the Battle of Liberty Place, the Metropolitan Police became the primary 
Republican response to violence in the New Orleans area during its lifetime.102 
 While some incidents were reported in the New Orleans region during late 
September and early October, escalation mostly occurred during late October as the 
election became imminent.  Jefferson Parish was basically an extension of New Orleans 
at this time, where the parish seat of Gretna was across the river from New Orleans, so 
violence in the two parishes often contained the same offenders and occurred within the 
same time frame.  In 1870, Jefferson Parish contained 11,054 blacks and 6,709 whites.  
On October 23, 1868, a group of white men organized claiming intent to disarm the black 
population to prevent an uprising, but instead ransacked homes and stole anything of 
value within, in the process threatening Republicans with death should they vote for 
Grant in November.  Finding these men to be a mockery of the code of chivalry preferred 
in the South, Lee reported that "nothing seemed small enough to merit the disdain of 
these chivalric gentlemen.  To steal fifty cent pieces and old women's spectacles from 
'niggers,' was not beneath the dignity of these champions of 'a white man's government.'"  
Only nine deaths were reported, but the white mob succeeded in its goal of Democratic 
domination in the parish.  Out of 2,400 total registered black men, 1,742 did not vote in 
November, giving the Democrats a victory in a parish with nearly a 2:1 ratio favoring 
black voters over whites.103 
 On the night of September 22, a relatively minor outbreak of violence occurred in 
predominately white New Orleans, which held a population of 140,923 whites and 
                                                 
102
 Acts of Louisiana, 1868, 85-98; Acts of Louisiana, 1869, 61-62; Taylor, 177-178; Melinda Meek 
Hennessey, "Race and Violence in Reconstruction New Orleans: The 1868 Riot," Louisiana History XX, 
No. 1 (Winter, 1979), 83. 
103
 Supplemental Report, xvii, 1-16, 237-238, 271; Ninth Census of Agriculture, 1870; Ninth Census of 
Population, 1870. 
  
76 
50,456 blacks.  Here, a Republican procession was marching down Canal Street when 
several Democrats taunted them from a store on the intersection of Canal and Bourbon 
streets.  Following the taunts, several whites began firing into the mostly unarmed 
Republicans on the street, forcing them to scatter.  Only one black man died while several 
sustained wounds, but no other casualties occurred that day.  Later that night, however, 
Joseph Ellerson, a prominent Democrat, attempted to ring an alarm for a black riot, but 
J.J. Williamson, the New Orleans chief of police, prevented him from doing so.  Lee 
determined for Ellerson's act to have been a signal to begin a massacre of local 
Republicans.  The next month in New Orleans was a time of "continuous and high 
excitement," where a general state of lawlessness existed and attacks were "exclusively 
by white Democrats upon Republicans."104 
 Little more than a month later, on October 24, New Orleans experienced a larger 
outbreak of violence.  Similar to the September 22 attack, on the night of October 24 a 
Republican procession met a Democratic procession traveling in the opposite direction on 
Canal Street.  White Democrats, concealed in the center of the street on the divider, 
began firing on the Republican procession.  Immediately after the gunfire, those involved 
in the Democratic procession broke rank and "stampeded" towards the Republicans, 
firing at them.  The uprising continued until the November 3 election date, as there was a 
"hunt" for Republicans in the area. The white rioters ransacked Republican clubhouses 
and besieged the office of the Superintendent of the Metropolitan Police.  The Innocents, 
a secret society based in New Orleans with red uniforms, were the main perpetrators here, 
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but the Seymour Knights held a strong regional following and the KWC "drilled nightly" 
in New Orleans.105 
 By October 26, after violence in surrounding parishes began, Warmoth found that 
the "civil authorities in the parishes of Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard are unable to 
preserve order and protect the lives and property of the people," handing control of New 
Orleans and the duty to preserve peace to General Rousseau.  Two days later, on October 
28, Rousseau issued an address to the citizens of New Orleans that prohibited gatherings 
of "large bodies on the streets," reorganized the police force by removing "inefficient 
members,"106 and warned those inclined towards violence that the military was now 
supporting the local police force.  However, violence against local Republicans 
continued, prompting Rousseau to speak in front of an Innocents meeting on October 31 
in a plea for peace.  During the presidential canvass, Lee's report estimated for 65 total 
deaths in Orleans Parish.  Although the majority of the Orleans Parish returns were 
invalidated because the board of supervisors that made the returns was not a legal one, 
only 276 Republican votes were tallied despite the 36,000 registered Republican voters in 
the parish.  The October 24 violence in New Orleans sparked uprisings in surrounding 
parishes, particularly in St. Bernard.107 
 St. Bernard Parish, bordering Orleans Parish to the southeast, contained a 
relatively even black: white ratio, with 1,913 whites and 1,640 blacks.  Around 
September 20, racial tension in St. Bernard nearly escalated into violence when whites 
coming from a Democratic meeting began to threaten both white and black Republicans.  
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These Democrats, mostly armed, went into procession and "lost no opportunity of 
insulting the black Republicans during the day, often brandishing knives and pistols in 
their faces."  Later that day, a large group of Innocents out of New Orleans searched for 
the Republican Parish Judge, A.G. Thornton, claiming that he was at fault for the dearth 
of black people at the meeting.  The Innocents could not find Thornton, but local 
Democrats announced their intent to dismantle the parish Republican Party here and one 
week later at a Republican meeting, in which Warmoth was a speaker, where threats 
against black men occurred and armed outposts organized with the intent of 
intimidation.108 
 During the afternoon of October 25, the day after the violence in New Orleans, an 
"unprovoked attack" occurred in St. Bernard when a Democratic procession found two 
black men by the side of the road.  These Democrats struck one of the black men and 
pointed a gun at him, who then pulled his gun and shot his assailant in the shoulder.  The 
Democrats then killed the two black men, initiating a parish-wide massacre of black 
people.  Later that day, sugar planter Thomas Ong, the Republican chairman of the board 
of registrars in St. Bernard, began to send for military aid.  Local Democrats shot the first 
courier sent, a policeman, before he could reach his destination.  The second courier 
arrived in New Orleans with a letter that described the parish as on the verge of a general 
"slaughter of innocent people."  With a nearly immediate response, a company of the 1st 
Infantry, numbering 24 men, traveled from Jackson Barracks in New Orleans to St. 
Bernard, leaving at around 3:00 a.m. on October 26 and arriving later that morning.109 
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 On the night of October 25, a confrontation occurred between freedmen and Pablo 
Fillieu, at Fillieu's house.  Who shot first is unclear, but Fillieu and at least one freedmen 
died, with the house looted and burned.  When the soldiers arrived in the area the 
following morning, they received word that Ong was in danger and traveled to his 
plantation.  When they reached the plantation, the soldiers found a large group of over 
sixty armed Democrats outside of Ong's gates.  These Democrats blamed Ong, as a 
Radical incendiary, for riling up the black population to the point of killing Fillieu.  In 
retribution, this "sheriff's posse" arrested several dozen men on Ong's plantation and 
reportedly looted their homes.  Due to their small numbers, the federal soldiers decided to 
secure Ong's plantation and provide safety for Republicans in need, but those outside of 
the plantation were still targeted by local whites.  Lee's report estimated that 68 total 
deaths occurred between October 25 and November 3, illustrating that while military aid 
was available for parishes in the vicinity of New Orleans, its effectiveness was limited.  
Many Republicans were arrested during this time period, one witness estimating 150 in 
total, only to be released after the election had transpired.  By the election, every 
supervisor of registration in the parish was either in jail or had fled the region.  As the 
supervisors were the only people authorized to present electoral returns for the parish, the 
sheriff had done so instead, resulting in the parish vote being thrown out due to illegal 
returns.110 
 St. Mary Parish, located southeast of St. Landry on the Gulf of Mexico with the 
parish seat of Franklin, contained one of the most conservative Democratic organs in the 
area with the Franklin Planter's Banner.  The Planter's Banner was edited by Daniel 
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Dennett, who was also a founding member of the KWC in Louisiana.  Although large 
scale collective violence was not found here, intimidation and a general feeling of danger 
amongst white and literate black Republicans was found.  On September 8, Colonel 
Henry Pope, the Republican sheriff based in Franklin, sent a response to a circular 
regarding the state of affairs in the parish, where he mentioned low levels of violence but 
found a "settled determination on the part of the leaders of the Democratic Party in the 
parish to draw out by every means in their power all white" Republicans.  By October 17, 
this tension had escalated and two of the few local white Republicans, Pope and Judge 
Valentine Chase, were "publicly assassinated" within Franklin's town limits.  While the 
white population vastly outnumbered the black population in St. Mary, 9,607-4,200, local 
Democrats, both white and black in this case, were still able to hunt prominent 
Republicans and either drive them out of the parish or kill them.  On October 18, 
materials used for the Republican paper in Franklin were destroyed and armed 
Democratic patrols roamed the parish until the November election.  This violence and 
intimidation was effective, as the parish board of registrars found that the Democratic 
majority "was not an expression of the will of the people."111 
 These parishes were by no means alone in experiencing violence during the 1868 
presidential campaign, as nearly every Louisiana parish experienced some form of 
violence or intimidation.  Some parishes, such as Franklin in northeastern Louisiana, 
experienced frequent violence but no information was found that suggests concentrated 
collective killings.  Here, Lee's report estimated fifty-seven deaths during the presidential 
canvass and observed that Democrats ran the November election "with a ticket in one 
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hand and a pistol in the other."  Presidential electoral returns were invalidated in 
Avoyelles, West Feliciana, Franklin, Jackson, Jefferson, Orleans, Sabine, St. Bernard, St. 
John Baptist, Terrebonne, St. Martin, and Washington parishes, mostly due to illegal 
voting procedures like the instances in Orleans and St. Bernard parishes.  While 
Republicans protested for additional invalidations due to intimidation or violence 
impacting the returns, their cries were to no avail.  Louisiana and Georgia were the only 
two Southern states in which Seymour emerged victorious.  With the invalidated returns 
in Orleans Parish, parishes with large populations that contained an intimidated black 
demographic, such as St. Landry, were able to carry the election for the Democrats, 
leading to a lopsided 80,225-33,263 victory for Seymour in Louisiana.  On the national 
scale, however, Grant easily won the electoral vote 214-80 while narrowly winning the 
popular vote 3,012,833-2,703,249.  Although Democrats had lost the election that they 
had deemed to be essential in the spring of 1868, the violence achieved long-term 
regional Democratic dominance in many parts of the state, and ultimately across the 
entire region.112  
 To dissolve the Democratic stranglehold on the country parishes gained as a result 
of the 1868 violence, Republican officials on the state level took several steps.  Signed 
into law on April 5, 1870 and organized by 1871, a volunteer state militia was created 
that helped offset the removal of a significant portion of federal troops in the South that 
had taken place since 1868.  This organization also provided a defense for state officials 
to supplement the Metropolitan Police.  Additionally, eight new parishes were created 
between 1868 and 1871, including Grant Parish, which would gain notoriety with the 
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Colfax Massacre of 1873.  Warmoth appointed officials himself in these new parishes, 
mostly located in rural northern Louisiana, providing Republicans temporary relief from 
Democratic control, as the new officeholders were secure in their positions until the next 
general election.  However, the fact that St. Landry Parish was not among those 
reorganized played a role in the Democratic domination in the parish for the remainder of 
Reconstruction.  After the St. Landry Massacre, Thomas C. Anderson was able to 
consolidate power both in St. Landry Parish and on the state level, where he secured 
multiple influential appointments over the course of his political career.113  
 On March 16, 1870, Louisiana passed a series of election laws.  These laws were 
designed to prevent the intimidation, violence, and fraud that permeated the 1868 
elections.  The most effective deterrent installed was the Louisiana Returning Board on 
Elections, which could invalidate returns found to be obtained by fraud or other illicit 
means.  This Returning Board, described by one historian as the "most feared weapon in 
the Radical arsenal," was able to control the outcome of elections for the party that was in 
power and played a large role in Louisiana politics for the remainder of Reconstruction.  
Initially, the board replaced its own vacancies, but the state senate gained the power to do 
so in an 1872 Louisiana election law.  In the 1872 and 1876 presidential elections, 
Louisiana was one of the states to have its Returning Board invalidate its votes due to 
violence and fraud.114 
In 1870, the Louisiana Returning Board contained a four-man committee: 
Governor Henry Clay Warmoth, Lieutenant Governor Oscar J. Dunn, Senator John 
Lynch (Rep.), and Senator Thomas C. Anderson.  Lynch would prove to be influential in 
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the heavily disputed 1872 state elections, favoring Republican William Pitt Kellogg, but 
Anderson's political affiliation is more unclear.  Historian Joe Gray Taylor labeled 
Anderson as a Radical Republican, but several other historians and sources from the time 
period found him to lean more towards the Democratic Party.  Historian Geraldine Mary 
McTigue's dissertation provides what is probably the most accurate description of 
Anderson, as an opportunist who was more interested in acquiring power while 
remaining conservative in ideology, rather than setting his political affiliation in stone.115 
 By 1870, Republicans in St. Landry were still pacified to the point of inactivity.  
On September 3, the Opelousas Journal printed an article titled "No Need of a 
Convention," where the editors found no trace of Republican organization or Republican 
candidates for the upcoming state elections.  By this time, "General" Thomas C. 
Anderson had solidified his power base within the parish.  Anderson, born in Virginia in 
1821, held terms as a state senator from 1864-1865 and 1868-1877.  He also held one of 
the coveted seats on the Louisiana Returning Board for its duration during 
Reconstruction, from 1870-1877.  In 1870, Anderson owned 1,800 acres of land and held 
property valued at $30,000, making him one of the wealthiest men in St. Landry.  But, a 
large amount of his power came from patronage and corruption.  Anderson owned part of 
a navigation company and used his influence to allocate parish funds to the company, 
which were mostly stolen.  Anderson was also the school treasurer in the parish, accused 
at one point of embezzling $85,000 from state funds.  Anderson's control was so 
complete that one historian concluded that all parish appointments went through him by 
the early 1870's.  As there was no Republican organization in the parish until 1872 and no 
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Republican newspaper until 1876, Anderson was able to control the parish virtually 
unchecked for the remainder of Reconstruction.116  
 On the national level, the Fifteenth Amendment passed as a direct result of the 
violence that encompassed the 1868 presidential election.  First proposed on February 27, 
1869, ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment occurred on March 30, 1870.  A short 
document, containing only two clauses, this legislation provided that voting rights can not 
be "denied or abridged...on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude" 
while placing enforcement powers with Congress.  However, as is later demonstrated by 
multiple bills designed to increase federal effectiveness in the enforcement of 
reconstruction measures, the intended effect of the Fifteenth Amendment was not 
realized.  Less than two months after its passage, additional legislation was in the works 
that aimed to increase federal power and control Southern violence.117 
 Between 1870 and 1871, three Enforcement acts passed in order to protect rights 
granted by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments.  Ratified just weeks before the 
Fifteenth Amendment on February 21, 1870, the First Enforcement Act's purpose was to 
prevent violence and intimidation towards voters.  The most important section of the First 
Enforcement Act was Section 6, which stated that "if two or more persons band or 
conspire together, or go in disguise upon the public highway, or upon the premises of 
another" with the purpose of preventing the "enjoyment of any right of privilege granted 
or secured to him by the Constitution," a felony charge would be levied.  However, these 
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actions were still not a federal offense, hindering federal enforcement attempts.  By early 
1871, the First Enforcement Act had proven to be inadequate in enforcement powers, and 
new legislation was necessary to prevent racial violence in the South.118 
 The First Enforcement Act targeted the rural South, but Northern cities also 
experienced electoral fraud during the 1868 elections.  To combat urban fraud, the 
Second Enforcement Act passed on February 28, 1871, but held little impact in the South.  
On April 20, 1871, the Third Enforcement Act passed, also known as the Ku Klux Klan 
Act.  This act followed a pattern of legislation during Reconstruction, where the federal 
government received greatly increased power and size.  Violators of Section 6 of the First 
Enforcement Act now faced a federal court.  As state and local governments had largely 
been unwilling to secure these rights for the black population and were often found aiding 
their violators, the President was now empowered to use military force and suspend the 
writ of habeas corpus to secure adherence.  The Ku Klux Klan Act also provided the 
federal government with the ability to prosecute individuals.  Until this point, federal 
legislation had focused on states abrogating freedmen's rights while allowing these states 
to hold most of the power to punish individuals.  Federal legislation had mostly ended in 
failure due both to the secretive nature of societies such as the Ku Klux Klan and a 
general white solidarity on the state and local levels.  With these new powers, federal 
agencies were able to successfully destroy structures of Democratic secret societies as 
they had existed and forced Southerners to resort to other strategies of regional control, 
primarily fraud.119 
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 In the 1872 presidential election, Ulysses S. Grant (Rep.) ran for a second term 
against Horace Greeley (Dem.).  Violence surrounding the 1872 presidential election was 
comparatively lower than the 1868 presidential election in Louisiana, as the 1868 
massacres still influenced the actions of many Republicans and by 1872 fear of the 
Enforcement Acts left Democrats resorting mostly to fraud instead of violence.  But, 
Democratic domination in St. Landry Parish continued despite being "free of 
disturbance," where Greeley defeated Grant 2,817-1,584 votes.  Grant still carried 
Louisiana 71,663-57,029, but both Louisiana's and Arkansas's votes were thrown out due 
to fraud.  On the national level, Grant easily won the electoral vote 286-66, but Greeley 
died shortly after returns were tabulated, causing a split in distribution among four 
additional candidates.  In Louisiana, the 1872 state elections would prove to be divisive 
and hotly contested, the results of which would instigate additional large scale collective 
violence within the state.120 
 By 1872, Radicalism had lost support nationally and Louisiana was no exception.  
In Louisiana, the Republican Party split prior to the gubernatorial election, where 
Warmoth disassociated himself with the general Republican ticket and ran with the 
Liberal Republican faction, which opposed further Reconstruction measures.  The Liberal 
Republican faction and the Democratic faction, with candidate John McEnery, merged, 
and if victorious Warmoth would gain a senatorial seat in Washington while McEnery 
would obtain the governorship of Louisiana.  This "Fusionist"121 faction was opposed by 
the Custom House Republicans, with William Pitt Kellogg as the candidate.  Stephen B. 
Packard, the chairman of the Republican State Committee, and P.B.S. Pinchback, of gens 
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de coleour ancestry, who held influence among black voters, supported the Kellogg 
ticket.  The Enforcement Acts had created the necessity for fraud instead of violence to 
control elections, which crippled McEnery's chances as a Democratic candidate against a 
Republican Returning Board.  One historian found that, with Warmoth's support, 
McEnery had most likely won the popular vote in the state, and the returns of St. Landry 
tell both of this and the fact that Democrats still dominated the parish, where McEnery 
received 2,948 votes to Kellogg's 1,346.  So much fraud was noted that the Returning 
Board split and each declared their own victor in the election, one led by Lynch 
supporting Kellogg and the other by Warmoth in support of McEnery.  This resulted in 
two sets of state officials and in many parishes two sets of local officials, both vying for 
one position.122  
 Since his inauguration in 1868, Warmoth had steadily lost support within 
Louisiana.  Warmoth inherited a large state debt, mostly from the Civil War when no 
state taxes were paid, which he struggled with during his governorship.  He also lost 
support from "pure" Radicals through some of his political appointments, one example 
being former Confederate General James Longstreet's appointment to Adjutant General.  
Corruption within the Warmoth government, his veto of a 1868 civil rights bill, and the 
compromise made in the 1872 state gubernatorial election were enough for his opponents 
to push for impeachment.  On December 5, 1872, Circuit Court Judge Edward Henry 
Durrell declared for the Warmoth Returning Board to be illegal and ordered Packard to 
prevent any "illegal assemblage" in the State House.  Acting immediately and without 
prepared articles of impeachment, Kellogg sympathizers voted 58-6 to impeach 
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Warmoth.  Under Louisiana law, Warmoth was suspended for the remainder of his term, 
little over a month, and P.B.S. Pinchback, the Kellogg Senate President, was installed as 
an interim governor.  The matter was sealed when Grant recognized Pinchback as the 
legal governor less than a week later.  The 1872 Louisiana elections brought schisms in 
an already weak Republican Party to the forefront and set the stage for additional 
violence, albeit less ubiquitous in the state when compared to events in 1868.123 
 In some country parishes, the rival factions created by the split Returning Board 
either refused to mutually accept Grant's verdict or news had not reached the area by that 
time, one of which being Grant Parish.  Grant Parish was created in 1869 with Colfax as 
its parish seat, located on the Red River in northern Louisiana.  Here, conflict between 
the two tickets escalated by the spring of 1873.  On the night of March 25, freedmen 
seized control of the Colfax courthouse in order to secure the validity of the Kellogg 
electees, swearing in their appointees the next day.  By early April, black and white 
numbers in the region swelled, both groups hoping to control the area.  On April 2, shots 
were exchanged between the two groups, but no one was hurt.  On April 5, freedman 
Jesse McKinney was shot and killed.  These two events in early April "alarmed" and 
instilled fear into the black population, causing them to gather in the Colfax courthouse 
for protection.  Over the next eight days, black forces attempted to fortify the courthouse 
while white forces gathered in the surrounding area.  Tension between the groups had 
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grown to the extent that one witness declared that Colfax was "in a state of siege" until 
April 13, Easter Sunday.124 
 On April 13, 1873, a white group of at least 150 members, led by ex-Confederate 
lieutenant Christopher Columbus Nash, mounted an attack.  The freedmen were severely 
outgunned during this confrontation, leading to a massacre the scale of which had not 
been seen since St. Landry in 1868.  As the courthouse became overran, local whites set 
it ablaze and shot any black citizens that exited in surrender.  As in St. Landry, local 
whites took black prisoners outside of the corporation and killed them after the 
excitement died down.  Because Colfax was in the Louisiana countryside, military 
intervention was more difficult than it would have been near the federal garrisons in New 
Orleans.  Due to inaction and transportation difficulties, troops did not arrive in Colfax 
until after the massacre.  As in many of these racial massacres, actual numbers dead are 
uncertain, with the preliminary Congressional report detailing 59 bodies found, only two 
of which were white.  Historians since have differed, with one more conservative 
estimate ranging between 62 and 81 total deaths and another estimating between 70 and 
165.125 
 To exacerbate racial tension and no doubt playing a role in the creation of White 
Leagues in 1874, Louisiana passed civil rights legislation on April 18, 1873.  This bill, a 
forerunner to the federal Civil Rights Act of 1875, provided universally equal 
accommodations "from all common carriers on land or water, from inn keepers and from 
all public places of resort licensed by the State or by any municipal corporation."  This 
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act was ignored in the country parishes, where the Republican state government had little 
control, and was rarely enforced in New Orleans.  In 1902, the 1873 Louisiana Civil 
Rights Act was repealed, having been of little significance during its lifetime.126 
 The first important interpretative ruling of the Fourteenth Amendment occurred in 
the Slaughterhouse Cases (1873), where a Louisiana chartered corporation had 
monopolized butchering in New Orleans, forcing many butchers out of work.  These 
butchers claimed that the state had deprived them of the opportunity to pursue their trade, 
violating their Fourteenth Amendment rights.  The result was a ruling in favor of the 
Louisiana corporation that redefined state and federal rights.  Federal rights were 
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, among them the right to run for a federal 
office and access to ports and waterways.  However, most individual rights were still 
under state control.  This was an important decision, as many of the struggles during 
Reconstruction rested upon whether the federal government or the state held control over 
individual rights.  If the state held control, especially going further into the 1870's, 
freedmen's rights granted by federal legislation were not necessarily guaranteed or 
protected.  The Slaughterhouse Cases set a precedent that would later be relied upon in 
cases more directly involving freedmen's rights, such as U.S. v. Cruikshank (1876).127 
 After mostly resorting to fraud to control elections after the Enforcement acts 
passed, Southern whites regained some confidence in violence and intimidation as 
effective methods to do so by 1874, especially as Southern governments began to revert 
to Democratic control.  By 1874 in Louisiana White Leagues began to appear, the first of 
which formed in St. Landry Parish.  On April 17, propaganda for the St. Landry White 
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League first appeared in the Opelousas Journal, one article containing a communication 
from leading man Edward T. Lewis, a local lawyer, titled "White vs. Black – The 
Coming Issue."  Here, Lewis wrote that whites had a "manifest duty" to prevent black 
men from holding office, but in order to do so the whites needed solidarity and 
organization.  Lewis also continued Democratic rhetoric claiming that white Republicans 
were self serving and taught black populations a "fear of the whites" only to further their 
own ambitions.  If this fear was absent, Lewis foresaw that "the next election would 
eventuate in a negro Governor and an exodus of carpet-baggers."  Although instilling fear 
in the black denizens of Louisiana was necessary for Democratic dominance in other 
parishes, even the Anderson influenced Journal saw these measures as unnecessary in St. 
Landry.  The Journal believed that securing a good crop outweighed the necessity of 
"political hostility to the blacks" in the parish.  According to the Journal, there was less 
organization among the black ranks in 1874 when compared to 1868, as there were no 
black officeholders in the parish, and although there were black men on the school board 
"there are plenty of white men who would make worse school directors."  But, behind 
these reservations were some of the same fears and ideals held by Lewis, where the 
Journal wrote that it would be "foolish" for a black man to run for office and the feeling 
that "whites were drifting...into the Republican organization."128 
 The St. Landry White League also impacted the state elections in late 1874.  To 
fill a vacancy in the Louisiana House, a special election occurred on December 29, 1873.  
Here, John Simms, the Republican homme de couleur who attempted to prevent violence 
in St. Landry during the 1868 massacre, easily beat three candidates who ran under an 
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Independent ticket.  However, only 733 votes were cast in St. Landry and one historian 
found traces of a deal struck between Simms and Anderson for the position.  Simms 
would only hold his seat until the 1874 state elections, where he lost his bid for 
reelection.  This election was mostly swept by the Democrats, who ran against a 
compound Radical ticket that was a compromise between parish Republicans and 
Democrats, containing members from both parties.  Democrats from both tickets won all 
four positions in the state House and both seats in the state Senate.  Representing the sole 
substantial Republican victory in the 1874 Louisiana elections, Charles E. Nash (Rep.) 
lost the vote in St. Landry for a Congressional seat but won the overall vote, the only 
black man to do so during Reconstruction.129 
 During the summer of 1874, White Leagues appeared across the state attempting 
to emulate the St. Landry organization, including St. Martin Parish.  A leader of the St. 
Martin Parish White League and a sugar planter, Alexandre DeClouet stated their 
purpose as "consolidating the white race in another effort to restore our state to its 
rightful rulers" and away from the "unscrupulous adventurers, knaves, and office seekers" 
that influenced the "blind and ignorant negro voters."  This rhetoric illustrated a White 
League goal of removing Republican Governor William Pitt Kellogg, one such attempt 
happening in New Orleans during September of that year.  While white supremacy 
remained the primary goal of the White Leagues, these organizations were different from 
the secret societies that ran rampant throughout the state during the 1868 elections, as 
meetings were generally in public view with no hidden intentions.  Although the White 
Leagues never had a strong central organization, local leaders were able to control its 
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members much more effectively and focus violence to a much larger extent than the 
earlier secret societies.  These Leagues were usually able to secure localities through the 
removal of Republican officials and intimidation of the black voters, leading to two cases 
of large scale collective violence in Coushatta and New Orleans.130 
 Similar to Grant Parish, Red River Parish was formed in 1871 in northwestern 
Louisiana, with the parish seat of Coushatta.  By 1874, Republican carpetbagger Marshall 
Twitchell created a power base in the parish much like Anderson's in St. Landry, holding 
a seat in the state Senate since 1870, the presidency of the parish police jury and school 
board, and a position as a United States Commissioner.  Members of his family also held 
influential positions within Red River Parish.  To compound matters for planters during 
the global depression that began in late 1873, the 1873 cotton crop had been ravaged by 
the cotton worm in the parish, leaving many planters in a desperate economic condition.  
As White Leagues focused on removing Republican power structures within Louisiana, 
Twitchell and his fellow parish officeholders became targets.  During the late summer 
months and into August, rates of violence and intimidation increased, including the 
murder of the deputy postmaster and banishment of the postmaster, culminating at the 
end of August.131 
 On August 25, 1874, an argument between two white locals and several black 
men occurred in Brownsville, eight miles south of Coushatta, where the black men 
threatened the whites.  That night, a white posse approached two of the black men, one of 
whom fired on the whites, instigating a skirmish where the two black men and one white 
man died.  News of an imminent black insurrection spread throughout the parish and a 
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large white crowd gathered in Coushatta by August 28, estimated to range between 700 
and 1,000 people.  Due to threats on the lives of Republican officeholders, white citizens 
offered to take these Republicans into custody for protection.  When the mob grew 
increasingly volatile over the next day, six of the Republicans signed resignation papers 
and were escorted out of the area on August 30.  But, in the process of leaving, local 
whites overtook the Republican escort and slaughtered all six, adding to the minimum of 
a dozen black deaths from August 25 to August 30.  Twitchell was safe in New Orleans 
during the massacre, but during his return the following May an unsuccessful attempt was 
made on his life.132   
 In early September, shortly after the Coushatta Massacre, rumors about shipments 
of arms for the New Orleans White League began to spread.  The Metropolitan Police 
confiscated several crates full with arms on two separate occasions, then on September 13 
sealed off access to the Mississippi, a ship that contained additional weaponry.  The 
seizure of the Mississippi infuriated the local White League, who called for all of its 
supporters to assemble the following day in order to overthrow Kellogg.   At around 2 
p.m. on September 14, White League and Metropolitan Police forces met on Canal Street 
and fought for nearly an hour.  Here, after clearing part of Canal Street and fearing that 
the White League forces would flank them, the Metropolitans fortified their position 
facing south towards the docks and the Mississippi.  However, the Metropolitans held 
their ground in a "very exposed" place while the White Leaguers were able to use cotton 
bales for cover, ultimately resulting in a near-complete White League victory.133 
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This victory gained the arms aboard the Mississippi for the White League, but 
they still strove to remove Kellogg from office, who had fortified his position in the 
Custom House.  White Leaguers were unable to breach the Custom House walls, but 
most of Kellogg's forces within were unwilling to die for the cause and deserted, 
dismantling the Louisiana State Militia established under Warmoth for all intents and 
purposes and severely crippling the Metropolitan Police force.  Within the next week, 
federal forces were able to retake New Orleans from the insurgent White Leaguers and 
restore Kellogg to his office, but roughly one hundred casualties had occurred by this 
point.  The Louisiana White Leagues represented a shift in the focus of violence, from the 
massacre of freedmen and expulsion of "incendiary" Republican influences to secure 
election results to the outright removal of Republicans from office.134 
 A new Civil Rights Act, largely created by Senator Charles Sumner (Rep.) in 
1870, had failed to pass on multiple occasions in the following years and was the topic of 
constant debate throughout the first half of the decade.  The bill finally passed nearly one 
year after Sumner's death, on March 1, 1875.  The primary purpose of the act was the 
requirement for equality in public accommodations and specifically mentioned "inns, 
public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement."  
Jurisdiction over violators of the act was given to federal courts rather than the state 
courts, which had proven to be inadequate in prosecuting civil rights violators.  However, 
court cases increasingly ruled in favor of states when interpreting prior legislation during 
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the 1870's and these decisions marginalized the Civil Rights Act of 1875.  By 1883, in 
the Civil Rights Cases, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was declared unconstitutional.135 
 The Enforcement acts received their first major test in U.S. v. Cruikshank (1876), 
the case that resulted from the Colfax Massacre.  The charge against the accused was a 
conspiracy to deprive citizens of their rights, violating Section 6 of the First Enforcement 
Act.  But, only three convictions were obtained, and the Court overturned a conviction by 
accepting callously that the prosecutors failed to mention race as the motivating factor 
behind the incident.  In another blow to freedmen's rights, Cruikshank ruled that the 
Fourteenth Amendment “prohibits a state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one citizen 
against another.”  This removed federal power to intervene in an area devastated by 
violence, leaving that power to state and local authorities.136 
 The presidential election of 1876 was one of the most contested in American 
history and the last of Reconstruction, pitting Rutherford B. Hayes (Rep.) against Samuel 
J. Tilden (Dem.).  In Louisiana, the gubernatorial election was held on the same day as 
the presidential election, where Francis T. Nicholls (Dem.) beat Stephen Packard (Rep.) 
by a slim margin.  In St. Landry Parish, Tilden outpolled Hayes 3,745-2,432 and Nicholls 
beat Packard, 3,750-2,445.  Votes reported from Louisiana in the presidential race 
favored Hayes, 75,315-70,508.  Fraud was present on both sides and some intimidation 
was found in several parishes that did not record a single Republican vote, but no 
incidents of large scale collective violence were noted.  As a result of the fraud in 
Louisiana, all four members of the Louisiana Returning Board were arrested, their trials 
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to be suspended until February, 1878.  Thomas C. Anderson was the last remaining 
member on the Louisiana Returning Board from its initial 1870 committee, and he was 
the only one who would see the courtroom.  Anderson was convicted and sentenced to 
two years in prison on February 25.  However, before the next member could be tried, the 
Louisiana Supreme Court nullified the charges against all four and forced the release of 
Anderson on March 18.137 
 In addition to Louisiana, returning boards in Florida and South Carolina declared 
for the results in their state to be invalid, with Louisiana and South Carolina both forming 
rival state governments, one Democratic and one Republican.  All three states showed a 
majority for Hayes, totaling 20 electoral votes, and with their removal Hayes lost the 
election 184 votes to 165.  Southerners had long realized that in order to secure fully 
redeemed governments, the federal military presence could not remain in the region.  To 
obtain this, the two parties agreed upon the infamous Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877, 
where the removal of the federal army from the South would occur in exchange for the 
validation of the lost electoral votes from Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina.  Not 
only did this remove the federal military from the region, but the rival Republican 
governments in Louisiana, led by Packard, and South Carolina were doomed to fail.  
With no federal presence in the South, blacks and white Republicans were at the mercy of 
the redeemed governments, officially ending the Reconstruction Era.138 
 The St. Landry Massacre and other similar events during the 1868 presidential 
canvas in Louisiana had accomplished their initial purpose: to secure the electoral victory 
for Horatio Seymour in Louisiana.  But, the consequences of these massacres reached 
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much further than the 1868 presidential election on the local, state, and national levels. 
While the 1868 massacres were not able to spawn influential court decisions as Colfax 
had, federal measures were taken and preventative mechanisms such as the Returning 
Board on Elections were placed in Louisiana that would play a significant role in state 
and national politics for the remainder of Reconstruction.  Nationally, 1868 represented 
the peak of collective violence during Reconstruction and illustrated that rights 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and other prior legislation needed additional 
protection.  This realization led to the Fifteenth Amendment and Enforcement Acts, 
where the secret societies responsible crumbled only when the Third Enforcement Act 
drastically increased federal power over the individual.  As Radical tendencies decreased 
by the early 1870's and Southern governments began the redemption process, a series of 
court decisions allowed for states to retain control of most individual rights.  As states 
controlled by the Democratic Party were unwilling or unable to intervene when 
freedmen's rights were violated, groups such as the Louisiana White Leagues were able 
to usurp positions of influence from incumbent Republicans.  In some areas, such as St. 
Landry Parish, these organizations were unnecessary, as prior violence still controlled the 
actions of the Republican populations.  But in others, like Coushatta, the Democratic elite 
was able to remove Republicans with established bases of power. 
 The 1868 St. Landry Massacre, the deadliest in Reconstruction, eliminated the 
Republican element of the parish for all intents and purposes for the remainder of the 
period.  Democrats directly involved in the violence secured local offices as a result, one 
example being Ferreol Perrodin and his ascension from deputy sheriff to mayor in early 
1869.  Those in charge were able to exponentially increase their power locally and 
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occasionally on a state and national level, such as Thomas C. Anderson.  Just months 
after the 1868 massacre, the black "living witnesses of their horrors, fathers, brothers, and 
sons, who meet us every day, dare not whisper a word in conviction of their crime" in 
fear of Democratic retribution.  The fear instilled in the local black population was so 
effective and resulted in a Democratic dominance so complete that violence as a means to 
secure electoral results was not necessary again until the 1890's, when outrages were 
again reported in St. Landry on the eves of the 1894 state elections and the 1896 
presidential election.139 
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